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Abstract 
 
 Why does it appear that the United States and Iran are on a crash course for conflict with 
one another and how can the United States craft legal foreign policies to deal with provocative 
Iranian actions moving forward? 
 The United States and Iran are on a crash course for conflict with one another because of 
the state actions associated with Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf. These 
provocative policies, i.e. the state’s nuclear program, support of international terrorism, and 
human rights violations may align with the regional aspirations, but elements of each are 
inconsistent with international law. While condemnation of Iranian breaches of its international 
legal obligations is sometimes present in American political discourse, discussion of the 
applicability of international law in crafting foreign policy responses has been irresponsibly 
minimal. In order to make informed policy choices, the international legal responsibilities of the 
United States must play a larger role in debate on the “Iran Question” moving forward. Once 
these obligations are considered, potential American responses are significantly limited. 
Currently, I argue, that only American sanctions and cyber attacks on Iranian nuclear 
infrastructure are legal under international law, but other responses, including the uses of force, 
(e.g. preemptive military strikes) are not. 
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Introduction 
 In 2003 the Iraq War drastically changed the composition of both the Persian Gulf and 
Middle East, sending geopolitical reverberations through both regions and the world at large. 
That war, in conjunction with the war in Afghanistan, installed the United States as a neo-
imperial power in the Persian Gulf and reconfigured the traditional power dynamics in what is 
considered one of the most strategically important regions of the world (Janowski, 2004, p.56). 
The political-security developments of the last decade have created many new realities for the 
Persian Gulf states, most notably a leadership vacuum among regional powers. Today, it is clear 
that Iran is the one state poised and ready to fill this gap, and it has already begun the process of 
pursuing a number of policies aimed at increasing regional power. A number of these actions, 
including the perpetuation of Iran’s nuclear program and the state’s support of international 
terrorism, however, have been met with condemnation from the United States placing the two 
states on a crash course for conflict with one another. 
 Although the United States and Iran currently have no formal diplomatic ties, indirect 
interactions between the two states have increased in recent years due to American concern with 
the polices alluded to above. These provocative actions, which are deemed illegitimate by much 
of the Western World, have increased calls across the globe to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of the Islamic Republic in order to prevent a large-scale conflict. In the United States 
specifically, few, if any, issues have come to dominate foreign policy discourse like the “Iranian 
Question.” With particular emphasis on the Iranian nuclear program, many American political 
leaders have called for more active foreign policy responses—options ranging from further 
diplomatic/economic isolation of Iran internationally, to a preemptive strike and/or overthrow of 
the current Iranian regime.  
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 The importance of a careful analysis of the dynamic relationship between the United 
States and Iran cannot be overstated and this paper spends a great deal of time in Part 2 exploring 
these current geopolitical circumstances. Foreign policy decisions made with only geopolitical 
considerations in mind, however, are shortsighted and incomplete. As the United States has 
painfully experienced since the start of the Iraq War in 2003, the consequences of entering into a 
conflict perceived by the international community to be illegal and illegitimate can be 
devastating to the image and future international objectives of any state. For this reason it is 
extremely concerning that applicable international law has been relatively absent from political 
discourse and there has been little academic work on the relationship between international legal 
commitments (both Iranian and American) and potential American foreign policy actions. The 
crux of my thesis, therefore, sets out to fill in this essential piece of the puzzle—utilizing the 
current geopolitical picture to inform an integral discussion of how potential foreign policy 
actions conform to international law.  
 By using international legal obligations of both the United States and the Islamic 
Republic as a lens for understanding the current relations between the two states, my thesis aims 
to answer the following, intertwined, research questions: Why does it appear that the United 
States and Iran are on a crash course for conflict with one another and how can the United 
States craft legal foreign policies to deal with provocative Iranian actions moving forward? By 
using international law as the framework of analysis and reference point for this study, I am able 
to paint a full picture of the current dynamics between the two states and explore how this 
relationship might move forward. Ultimately, I argue that the United States and Iran are on a 
crash course for conflict with one another because of the internationally provocative Iranian 
policies associated with the state’s pursuit of regional hegemony. Specifically I identify the 
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state’s nuclear program, human rights violations, and support of international terrorism as cause 
for concern in the United States. These actions, many aspects of which are violations of 
international law, provide a legal justification for the United States to pursue certain foreign 
policy responses. At this point, I argue that the United States sanctions and cyber attacks on 
Iranian nuclear infrastructure are legal under international law, but other uses of force (e.g. 
preemptive military strikes) are not. Additionally, I contend that international law must play a 
much greater role in American political discourse on the subject of Iran. 
 In the next section I outline my research methodology for this study, explaining how the 
legality of American foreign policy responses to Iran can only be understood in light of the 
geopolitical dynamics of the Persian Gulf and examination of Iranian breeches of international 
law. Next, in Part 2, I detail some of the most important “relevant geopolitical facts” that explain 
why the United States and Iran appear to be on a crash course for conflict with one another. This 
analysis includes some prerequisite information, including a definition of the region of study and 
exploration of Iranian regional aspirations necessary to contextualize the remainder of the paper. 
In Part 2 I also explore Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony in three areas; (1) the state’s attempt 
to build a security umbrella, (2) its treatment of its civil and political societies, and (3) its 
regional power politics. In Part 3, my attention shifts to the subject of international law, arguing 
that the legal obligations of the United States must play a greater role in foreign policy discourse 
moving forward. Subsequently, in Part 4, I explore Iran’s policy manifestations of the pursuit of 
regional hegemony in the context of international law, enumerating current Iranian violations 
that provide the justification for American responses. Finally, in Parts 5 and 6, I turn my 
attention to the two primary areas of these responses, the use of force and sanctions, exploring 
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each in the context of American international legal obligations and making the case for which 
specific policies are currently legal for the U.S. to employ.  
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Research Methodology 
 Unlike other studies that rely exclusively on geopolitical dynamics examine the current 
relationship between the United States and Iran; this study focuses on the additional dimension 
of international law. As alluded to in the introduction, the methodology that will be employed in 
this paper is inextricably linked to geopolitics, since it is geopolitical conditions that inform how 
international law can be applied to both states. The addition of legal analysis also allows for a 
more comprehensive study capable of examining not only the current relations, but also potential 
future interactions between the two states.  This study is not prescriptive in nature; i.e. it does 
argue which foreign policies should ultimately be employed by the United States with regard to 
Iran. I do, however, make the argument that international law must play a greater role in 
American foreign policy discourse on the “Iranian Question” and that it behooves the United 
States to exclusively utilize actions that conform to the state’s international legal obligations. 
While this underlying argument is relevant throughout, the crux of this paper is devoted to 
identify which specific American foreign policy actions towards Iran are currently legal under 
international law.  
 The end goal of finding what, if any, legal justification exists for American 
interventionist policies towards Iran is predicated on a thorough examination of how current 
Iranian policies conform to international law. To accomplish this task it is necessary to zoom out 
even further and examine the context for provocative Iranian policies such as the state’s support 
of international terrorism. These “relevant facts” or geopolitical circumstances provide a 
necessary perspective for understanding why Iranian leadership has decided to pursue specific 
policies that have placed the state on a crash course for conflict with the U.S. After these policies 
are contextualized, I move on to an investigation of how specific Iranian actions conform to the 
Siegel, 12 
international legal obligations of the Islamic Republic. I use this analysis, in turn, to identify 
what legal responses the United States has at its disposal; since it is Iranian violations of 
international law that provide the legal justification for American intervention. In the end, I argue 
that the United States is left with a very limited set of legal foreign policy actions, but as is 
always the case when examining questions of international law, the legality of all actions has the 
potential to change in the future in light of new geopolitical circumstances.   
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Part 1: Relevant Geopolitical Facts 
 
1.1—Defining the Region of Study 
 The Persian Gulf, literally, is the body of water located in Southwest Asia between Iran 
and the Arabian Peninsula. The term “Persian Gulf” refers primarily to that body of water, but in 
a geographical and political context it has also come to denote the region of surrounding 
countries. The Persian Gulf region is comprised of eight states: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Also a part of the larger “Middle 
East” system, the security dynamics of that Gulf are not independent of the Levant to the west. 
Though the Persian Gulf remains a part of that larger area, simply folding the Gulf into the larger 
Middle East in the context of discussion runs the risk of having other issues (e.g. the Arab-Israeli 
conflict) drive the analysis of the Gulf’s own 
dynamic regional politics (Gause, 2010, p.5). 
Thus, while events in the Levant affect the 
regional politics of the Persian Gulf, the 
region does retain its own political and 
security independence, as well as an 
international importance that sets it apart as 
its own sub-system (Gause, 2010, p.3). The 
Persian Gulf has been the target of high levels of foreign intervention throughout history 
(explained below), but within the region itself the Gulf’s major powers have been the most 
important entities vying for influence. This competition became especially important to the 
world at large following the discovery of oil there in 1908. Subsequently, as the world’s use of 
fossil fuels has increased, the region’s importance has grown exponentially.  
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1.11—Geopolitical Importance of the Persian Gulf 
 The modern importance of the Persian Gulf cannot be overstated. To many scholars of 
international relations, the Gulf has become the most important region of the world because of its 
geostrategic placement and its fossil energy deposits (Milani, 2009, p.349).  Geographically, the 
Persian Gulf links the three continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, andfour bodies of water: the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean (Sajedi, 2009, p.77). In 
this regard, the region has for centuries been integral to both global trade and business. The 
primary importance of the Persian Gulf in the modern world, however, is its natural resource 
deposits, principally oil and natural gas. These resource endowments have allowed the region to 
assume a special status in the national security strategy of developed and developing countries 
across the globe (Sajedi, 2009, p.83). According to the United States Energy Information 
Administration, upwards of 56% of the world’s remaining convention crude oil, are found in the 
Persian Gulf (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Because of its low cost of production and high prices, 
the resource provides massive revenues to the Gulf States. It is estimated that the total oil wealth 
in the Gulf today is on the order of $75 trillion (Chapman & Khanna, 2004, p.9).  
1.2—The United States and the Persian Gulf  
 American intervention in the Persian Gulf dates back to the discovery of oil in the region 
in 1908. As the developed world increased its reliance on oil over the 20th Century, the geo-
strategic importance of the region to the United States became even more significant. For this 
reason the U.S. became progressively more involved in regional politics. In 1979, following the 
overthrow of the American backed Shah, President Carter articulated the American commitment 
to securing its interests in the region; “Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
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interests of the United States of America, and such assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force” (Sajedi, 2009, p.85). From that point forward, U.S. 
involvement has primarily taken the form of military engagement, in an effort to ensure regional 
stability and protect energy resources (Sajedi, 2009, p.83-86).  
 Unlike American intervention in the Persian Gulf in the 20th Century, the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 represented a departure from previous foreign policy objectives. The Bush 
administration fundamentally shifted the purpose of American foreign policy in the region away 
from promoting stability towards an ambitious neoliberal effort to reshape the international and 
domestic politics of the region (Gause, 2010, p.14). As noted below, this decision upset the 
traditional balance of power in the region, creating a leadership vacuum that now defines 
regional security politics. Today the Persian Gulf remains as important as ever to the 
industrialized world, which remains dependent on fossil fuel energy exports from the region. 
Increased terrorism and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction to the region, 
however, have made the industrial world very worried about the safety of energy resources 
(Sajedi, 2009, p.78). While the Bush administration provided a variety of justifications the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, there is no question that the desire to exert influence over Gulf oil 
played a part in the decision to continue the U.S. record of intervention in the region.  
1.3—Power Dynamics and Leadership in the Persian Gulf 
 While the importance of the Persian Gulf to global powers, like the U.S. (who are large 
oil consumers) has led to substantial foreign intervention, the region’s historical power dynamics 
have always prevented one state from achieving geopolitical dominance in the region. The 
Persian Gulf’s internal power dynamics have traditionally been defined by internecine conflicts 
among rival nations (Sajedi, 2009, p.78). For the most part, these conflicts have occurred 
Siegel, 17 
between two of the three most powerful nations in the region: Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia is also 
one of, if not the most, powerful states in the Gulf, but it has not been a major player the attempt 
to take a regional leadership role (see below). In this regard, the geopolitical history of the 
Persian Gulf has been dominated by Iran and Iraq jostling for regional status. The inability of 
either of those two states to take the primary leadership role, however, became arguably the most 
important geopolitical condition in the region. Even the eight-year war that the two countries 
fought with one another produced no clear winner, as each failed to achieve regional 
predominance. At times each has been able to utilize its economic, diplomatic, or military power 
to exert some influence over other members of the Gulf system, but neither has been powerful 
enough to be able to control the politics and policies of the other (Gause, 2010, p.6). In this 
regard, the condition of constant competition created a bipolar stability in which neither state 
was able to assume the leadership role.  
 Because the foreign policies and regional objectives of Iran and Iraq have been concerned 
with preventing their rival from achieving dominance in the region, the geopolitical power 
balance in the Persian Gulf prior to 2003 was defined as bipolar (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 272). In 
this regard, the power competition between the two states was a zero-sum game. Iranian gains in 
terms of its regional security and power projections served as Iraqi losses, and vise versa. The 
invasion of Iraq, however, altered the geopolitical composition of the region, quickly removing 
Iraq from the position of an external balancer to Iran and elevating the state’s regional status 
immediately.  
1.31—The Case of Saudi Arabia: Ambivalence to Regional Leadership  
 From a historical perspective many scholars consider the Persian Gulf’s traditional power 
dynamics to be tri-polar, with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia contending for leadership. Today, 
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however, following the Iraq War, Saudi Arabia is the only Gulf state that rivals Iran in terms of 
hard power. The Saudi armed forces total 229,000 men and the Saudi air force is considered to 
be the strongest in the region (Cordesman, 2004, p.325 and 333). The state, however, has major 
deficiencies in terms of its naval power (which is especially significant in the Gulf) and does not 
rival Iran in terms of asymmetric power since it lacks a nuclear weapon (Cordesman, 2004, p. 
334). The Saudi Arabian military is also heavily reliant on equipment from the United States, but 
military cooperation between the two countries became somewhat strained because of tensions 
over the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent war on terrorism (Cordesman, 2004, 
p.312 and 326).  
 Today, while Saudi Arabia certainly holds a hard power advantage in the Southern Gulf, 
it has not utilized its military strength to exercise leadership in the region. Increases in Saudi 
influence in the Gulf have been hampered by three main factors: pressure from international 
actors (e.g. the United States), a preoccupation with the politics of the Levant, and a general 
ambivalence regarding the leadership dynamics of the Persian Gulf.  In terms of foreign pressure, 
the close association between Saudi Arabia and the United States has strained the state’s 
relations with other Muslim countries and challenged the kingdom’s ability to portray itself as 
the leader of the Islamic cause (Metz, 1992).  In this regard, Saudi Arabia has been unable to 
capitalize on the crosscutting cleavage of Sunni Islam, in order to build support throughout the 
region, an essential component of regional hegemony.  
 The second factor that has prevented Saudi Arabia from pursuing regional leadership in 
the Persian Gulf is the state’s preoccupation with the politics and security dynamics of the 
Levant. While Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy goals include Arab nationalism, rhetoric has been 
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dominated by the plight of the Palestinians, and the conflict with Israel, rather than goals relative 
to the Persian Gulf sub-system (Metz, 1992).  
 The final factor preventing Saudi Arabia from pursuing regional leadership has been the 
state’s general attitude toward the eastern half of the Middle East. While Riyadh has never 
ignored the international politics of the region, their policies reflect ambivalence toward the 
power dynamics of the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has at times supported the regime in power in Iraq 
(e.g. during the Iran-Iraq War), but it has also supported Iran at various points in history (e.g. 
during the Persian Gulf War). These shifts in support reflect the general Saudi position to favor 
the strong side in regional conflicts, preferring to bandwagon with the more powerful party, 
rather than become vulnerable to confrontation (Amidror, 2007, p. 4). Overall it is this 
inconsistent foreign policy towards the regional Gulf states that illustrates Saudi Arabia’s 
ambivalent attitude, and lack of desire to challenge for, regional leadership in the Persian Gulf.  
1.32—A Leadership Vacuum: Iran’s New Regional Position 
 In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States once again firmly 
entrenched its interests in the Persian Gulf region. At the same time, the internal politics of the 
region remained in constant flux. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq quickly 
altered the balance of power that defined the region for decades. As explained above, because of 
Saudi Arabian ambivalence to the political and security dynamics of the Persian Gulf, the 
attempt to achieve regional leadership has been defined as a contest between Iran and Iraq. While 
the two states fought the longest conventional war of the 20th Century against one another, the 
bipolarity between them prevented either state from achieving regional predominance and 
created some regional stability (Hiro, 1991, p. 1). Today, however, following the Iraq War and 
the total decimation of Iraqi power, the security dynamics of the Gulf appear much different. 
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These changes to the security composition of the Persian Gulf are most evident and important to 
Iran, which now faces new opportunities for expanding its regional power. According to Kayhan 
Barzegar, the geopolitical changes in the Middle East prompted by the wars in Iran and 
Afghanistan have created new opportunities for Iran by placing the state at the center of the 
region’s political and security developments (Barzegar, 2010, p.175). On the regional playing 
new developments continue to elevate Iran’s regional status and make the state the likely 
candidate to fill the leadership vacuum. 
 While the physical presence of the United States in the Gulf fundamentally altered the 
traditional power breakdown of the region, today American plans for large troop withdrawals 
from both Afghanistan and Iraq continue to elevated Iran’s regional position (Miliani, 2009, 
p.350). In August 2010, President Obama announced the end of combat operations in Iraq and 
subsequently established plans for a near total troop withdrawal from Iraq, completed at the end 
of 2011 (Pollack, 2010 and CNN, 2010). Additionally, in July 2011 the Obama administration 
set out plans to remove the remaining 55,000 troops from Afghanistan by September 2012 
(CNN, 2011). If current plans remain unchanged, the United States will remove over 90,000 
military personal from the Persian Gulf over the next two years (CNN, 2011).  
 More recently, the Arab Spring continued to alter the geopolitical map of the Persian 
Gulf and larger Middle East region, also contributing to Iran’s newfound powerful regional 
position. While it is difficult to predict the long-term implications the Arab Spring will have in 
the region, the removal of traditional regimes from power in strong states like Egypt as well as 
the wave of political unrest that has occurred in even the most autocratic states like Saudi Arabia, 
also elevate the status of Islamic Republic. Regime changes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen 
present Iran with the opportunity to improve its relations with new governments (Barzegar, 
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2011). Egypt, for example, was a leading voice of anti-Iranian sentiment in the Arab world under 
the leadership former President Hosni Mubarak (Barzegar, 2011). Today, however, the 
establishment of a new government has allowed for a resurgence of groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood, who could potentially be more interest in increasing bilateral ties with the Islamic 
Republic (Barzegar, 2011). Although, like the Egyptian population, the Muslim Brotherhood is 
predominantly Sunni, Iran hopes to capitalize on similar goals and work towards increased 
cooperation (Barzegar, 2011). Overall, while the long-term developments of the Arab Spring 
remain unclear, developments have contributed to Iran’s increasing regional role. By advocating 
Islamic unity and working to forge good relations with Arab countries throughout the region, 
Iran can capitalize on the Arab Spring.  
 Each of these security developments have drastically altered the geopolitical map of the 
Persian Gulf and today it is clear that no state is in a better position to elevate its regional role 
than Iran. Iran is already one of the two most powerful nations in the Persian Gulf, and so long as 
Saudi Arabia maintains its ambivalent position to the region, Iran is the only state strong enough 
to fill the leadership vacuum in the region. The 2003 war, both overthrew the Sunni regime in 
Iraq that had been a perpetual barrier to increased Iranian influence in the Gulf; liberating and 
energizing the Shi’a population there (Milani, 2009, p.350). The United States continues to 
disengage from Iraq and the Shi’a majority provides a foundation for Iran to begin to increase its 
sphere of influence and potentially become the regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf (Milani, 
2009, p.360).  
 A regional hegemon is defined as the leading power that dominates in a subordinate state 
system that sets the rules and utilizes its influence and/or power projections to accomplish its 
foreign policy goals and objectives (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.40, and Myers, 1991, p.5). Because of 
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the geopolitical circumstances detailed above, the stage has been set for Iran is poised to pursue 
this foreign policy goal in an effort to finally achieve regional predominance and work towards a 
number of other national objectives detailed in the next section.  
1.4—Understanding Iranian Regional Aspirations  
 Simply because a state is faced with the geopolitical condition that coincide with a 
particular foreign policy strategy does not necessarily mean the state will pursue that foreign 
policy path. In this regard, it is essential to enumerate the reasons why Iran will pursue the 
foreign policy path of attempting to achieve regional hegemony and subsequently place the state 
on a crash course for conflict with the U.S. Although many scholars contend that every state 
desires to expand its power and influence internationally, in this section I explore three of the 
primary motivations modern Iran will engage in this pursuit: (1) threat perception, (2) domestic 
politics, and (3) foreign policy aspirations (Reut Institute, 2007).  
1.41—Threat Perception  
 The first category of reasons why Iran will pursue regional hegemony is based on its 
threat perception. Threats to the Iranian regime follow largely on Iran’s new geopolitical position 
within the leadership vacuum of the modern Persian Gulf. Iran’s historic enemy, Iraq, has been 
destroyed, and although the United States is militarily disengaging from the region, the Islamic 
Republic remains a target of international pressure. The threat that Iran’s sovereignty will be 
encroached upon by imperial powers is an entrenched fear amongst the Islamic Republic’s 
political elite (Milani, 2009, p.351).  Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has considered 
American global-hegemony as a very real danger and until the troop pullout is totally complete 
the United States remains in prime position to utilize its physical power against Iran. Also, 
because of the United States’ sheer power advantage throughout the globe, even after troop 
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concentrations in the region are decreased, the existential threat posed by the United States will 
remain a clear and present danger. This problem is compounded by the abundance of natural 
resources present in the region. Iran itself is in control of vast quantities of oil and natural gas, 
but increased regional power would allow Iran to take charge of the energy resources in the 
region as a whole (Reut Institute, 2007). Finally, as the Arab Spring continues to alter the 
geopolitical map of the Middle East, completely restructuring some powerful states and forcing 
many others to turn their attention to their domestic politics, Iran finds itself in a prime position 
to expand its regional influence by building alliances with new regional governments.  
 A second aspect of Iran’s threat perception is the fact that the state lacks any true allies in 
the region (with the exception of Syria in the Levant). The Islamic Republic is in the process of 
attempting to building better relationships with other Middle Eastern states and will continue to 
do so in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, but it does not have an established formal alliance with 
any other state (Milani, 2009, p.351). In this regard, Iran is currently forced to rely exclusively 
on its own foreign policy to accomplish international objectives. Iran is currently, for example, 
pursuing its own nuclear program to counter the atomic threats from Israel and to a lesser extent 
Pakistan (Milani, 2009, p.351). Overall, Iran’s desire to protect its territorial integrity and natural 
resources, are one aspect of the state’s desire to pursue regional hegemony (Reut Institute, 2007). 
1.42—Domestic Politics  
 Next, in terms of domestic politics, Iran seeks to pursue a foreign policy that increases 
legitimacy for the current Iranian regime. By pursuing an active foreign policy in the Persian 
Gulf, Iran can both divert public attention from domestic problems and promote regime 
legitimacy. Since the rise of revolutionary Iran, elites within the Islamic Republic have placed 
national unity above the protection of individual human rights and regime strength over 
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protections of the society from state abuses (Afshari, 1994, p.235). While Iran claims to be semi-
democratic and does include certain elements of democracy (e.g. the election of a president with 
universal suffrage), ultimate authority is left in the hands of unelected and often oppressive 
individuals and rigid institutions (e.g. the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council) (Hauss, 
2006, p.370-399). Additionally, the few democratic elements of the Iranian government have 
recently come under fire. The 2009 reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for example, 
was affected by significant fraud, showing that supreme authority in the state is well outside of 
the people’s control (Mebane, 2009, p.21). Today the majority political opinion of the Iranian 
population favors fundamental changes to governance and the introduction of some democratic 
and free market social reforms (Clawson, 2004, p.16). Members of one reform party in the 
Iranian parliament have gone as far as to proclaim that they are “unwilling to be present in a 
parliament that is not capable of defending the rights of the people and which is unable to 
prevent elections in which the people cannot choose their representatives” (Adib-Moghaddam, 
2006, p.666). These injustices are compounded by the fact that people are inherently blocked 
from changing the government of their own state, due to the unelected elements.  
 Inherent illegitimacies in government and constant calls for reform force the current 
regime to divert public attention in order to build support and maintain power. The process of 
attempting to achieve regional hegemony provides the Iranian government the opportunity to 
divert domestic attention to international issues such as a confrontation with the United States. It 
is important for Iran to avoid a large conflict with the United States, but it is also beneficial for 
Iran to enact policies that are somewhat antagonistic and prompt rhetorical responses. By 
emphasizing the perceived illegitimacy of American action in the region, the regime is able to 
build nationalism and support. Specific policies manifestations of the pursuit of regional 
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hegemony (e.g. supporting terrorist organizations such as Hizballah and Hamas) prompt 
international responses, which have mainly taken the form of economic sanctions and threats of 
military force. These policies have some negative implications for the Islamic Republic, but the 
regime is also able to capitalize on international pressures in the attempt to create the “us vs. 
them” mentality within the society (Bennis, 2009). This mentality capitalizes on the proud nature 
of Iranian citizens, building support for the regime and reinforcing their ultimate goal to remain 
in power (Majd, 2009). According to Reza Afshari, indifferent-to-hostile discourse and overall 
attitude of the West has always added urgency to the nationalistic rhetoric, playing into the hand 
of Iranian leadership, perpetuating their power as well as their policies (Afshari, 1994, p.235). 
Even the possibility of future talks between Iran and the West on issues such as the nuclear 
program, which would appear to show elements of cooperation, are counterproductive, deflecting 
attention away from Iran’s domestic problems and giving Iranian leadership a free hand in 
suppressing domestic opposition (e.g. the ‘green movement’) (Takeyh, Los Angeles Times, 
12/5/2010). Overall, international attempts to diplomatically attack Iran have been futile as they 
hurt innocent Iranian civilians and inflame public opinion, uniting the country behind the 
illegitimate regime (Landler, New York Times, 9/27/2009). As the Iranian government portrays 
international pressure as anti-Iranian (rather than simply anti-government), they are able to create 
a “rally-around-the-flag” (i.e. support for the country’s leadership in a time of trouble) mentality 
amongst its citizens (Mueller, 1973, p.58). The pursuit of regional hegemony may be seen as a 
manifestation of the diversionary politics in which the current regime utilizes to deflect attention 
away from its inherent illegitimacy. 
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1.43—Foreign Policy Objectives  
 Finally, Iran has a number of other foreign policy objectives that help to explain the 
state’s pursuit of regional hegemony. These aspirations include a desire to protect the Shi’a 
Muslims of the Persian Gulf (and Middle East at large), to influence the regional process, to 
export the revolution, and to achieve recognition of Iran’s power internationally. All of these 
objectives, enumerated below, push Iran to pursue regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf.  
 One of the most important aspects of Iran’s desire to achieve regional hegemony stems 
from its demographic status as a Shi’a state. There are nearly 58 million Shi’a currently living in 
Iran, accounting for 81% of its total population and upwards of 35% of the total Shi’i population 
worldwide (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Iran is one of only three states with a Shi’i majority 
(the others are Iraq and Bahrain), but is the only state with a Shi’i controlled government. Since 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979 a foreign policy priority of the regime has been a desire to protect 
Shi’a interests in the Persian Gulf and world at large. Other Persian Gulf states have significant 
Shi’a populations, but Iran is the only state in which power resided exclusively with Shi’a 
Muslims. As Shi’a Muslims living elsewhere in the Persian Gulf have faced persecution Iran has 
become the de-facto “Big Brother Shi” state; similar to the position of Russia as the “Big Brother 
Slav” prior to World War I (The Economist, September/October 2009, p.60). In both instances, 
the most powerful state that shares a common identity bond with large populations of individuals 
elsewhere within the region looks after the interests of those individuals. Modern tensions 
between Sunni governments and the Shi’a populations living within their states can be traced 
back to the Islamic Revolution, which inspired unrest among fellow Shi’a populations elsewhere 
in the Gulf (The Economist, September/October 2009, p.60). To calm these sectarian pressures 
Sunni leaders gave their Shi’a subjects some basic rights with the promise that they would 
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receive more in the future. In turn, Iran reduced its attempts to export revolutionary fervor to 
rhetoric meant only to keep the long-term foreign policy goal alive (The Economist, 
September/October 2009, p.60). The return to aggressive Iranian discourse under President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, has once again triggered some outbreaks of Shi’a persecution 
throughout the Gulf. This increase in religious tension coincides with Iran’s growing regional 
influence, providing Iran with large support bases throughout the region. “The more recent rise 
of Shi’a influence in Iraq and the success of Hizballah, the Shi’a party-cum-militia in Lebanon, 
have caused similar waves, made stronger by Iran’s bid to become the dominant—and perhaps 
nuclear-armed—regional power” (The Economist, September/October 2009, p.60). Overall, 
Iran’s desire to protect the Shi’a interest throughout the Persian Gulf, and Middle East at large, 
serves as one of the most important foreign policy aspirations pushing Iran toward the pursuit of 
regional hegemony.  
 Iran has often reduced its desire to export the revolution to rhetoric designed to set the 
Islamic Republic apart from the other Muslim states, but today the current regime has reasserted 
the objective as a foreign policy goal. The concept of “exporting the revolution” derives from the 
feeling prevalent in the Islamic world that Muslims should liberate themselves from the 
oppression of imperialist foreign powers (Metz, 1987). The concept also extends to non-Muslim 
states and communities across the globe that feel subjugated by the dominance of the United 
States (Metz, 1987).  Since the U.S. has once again asserted its power in the Persian Gulf, the 
concept of exporting the revolution has also experienced a resurgence with Iranian leadership, 
bringing revolutionary rhetoric back to the forefront of their foreign policy discourse. Today, the 
concept is utilized in many of the same ways it was following the revolution of 1979. First, it is 
used as a way to intimidate the Arab states into refraining from siding with the United States 
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(Milani, 2009, p.351).  Next, to facilitate and invigorate Shi’a support and train a new generation 
of Shi’a activists (Milani, 2009, p.351).  Most importantly, however, it is utilized to elevate Iran 
to the position of ideological hegemon of the region (Milani, 2009, p.351). By asserting its role 
as the counterpoint to the United States in the Persian Gulf, Iran is able to create a similar “us vs. 
them” mentality in the international system that is perceived by many to be unjust towards 
Muslims (Reut Institute, 2007). Exporting the revolution will protect the interest of Muslims 
worldwide and allow Iran to expand its political influence (Reut Institute, 2007). In this regard, 
states are forced to choose between becoming a stooge of American imperialism and aligning 
their position with the one state willing to stand up to U.S. hegemony (Fuller, 206, p.146). New 
Iranian attempts to export the revolution and take its place as the ideological hegemon have 
taken root both inside and outside the Persian Gulf region. Internally in Bahrain and Kuwait, for 
example, pro-Iranian groups have emerged in response to perceived American injustice in the 
Gulf (Milani, 2009, p.353). In addition, while they may comply with international policies of the 
U.S. (e.g. sanctions against Iran), many Gulf States have increased their economic and military 
cooperation with the Islamic Republic (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). Externally, the ongoing struggle 
against the state of Israel has provided Iran with a base of groups who feel directly affected by 
the unjust action of the United States within the Middle East. The plight of the Palestinians in the 
Gaza strip as well as the Shi’a living in Southern Lebanon led to the birth of Hamas and 
Hizballah respectively; two groups whose interests coincide with Iran’s goal of exporting the 
revolution directly. In addition, Iran has also increased its relations with other states that feel 
victimized by American hegemony international. President Ahmadinejad has reached out to and 
formed alliances with other “rogue states” such as Venezuela and North Korea (Karmon, 2009, 
p.3). Iran’s goal to export the revolution has not always been one of the state’s most important 
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foreign policy objectives, but today it has once again become a primary goal of the regime in its 
pursuit of regional hegemony.  
 Iran’s attempt to achieve regional hegemony is also based on status, i.e. the state’s desire 
to be recognized as a global power. While Iran has always been one of the most powerful states 
in the Middle East, it has been faced with constant attempts by the United States to undermine its 
national stability and the Islamic regime’s legitimacy. These antagonistic policies have prevented 
Iran from achieving what it believes to be its rightful position as a world power (Reut Institute, 
2007). Following on the Persian tradition as one of the world’s oldest and richest civilizations, 
modern Iran desires to restore itself to the prominent global position it once possessed (Juneau, 
2009, p.6). In this regard, Iran’s attempt to achieve regional hegemony coincides with its desire 
to be recognized as a legitimate regime by the international community and prevent further 
attempts to undermine current leadership (Reut Institute, 2007). While the United States reserves 
a status of immunity for select powerful states that it is ideologically opposed to such as Russia 
and China (i.e. they are legitimate in the eyes of the U.S. even though they may be criticized for 
a variety of reasons), Iran has been constantly subjected to antagonistic American policies (Reut 
Institute, 2007). In the eyes of Iranian leadership, there is no reason why it should not be taken 
seriously as a leading global state based on its history, resource endowment, current status as a 
powerful regional state and future objectives in the region and world at large (Reut Institute, 
2007). One integral component of global power, however, is a state’s ability to influence the 
geopolitical dynamics of its home region (Russett, et al., 2006, p. 98-99). Therefore, in order to 
achieve the global status it desires, Iran must first be able to overcome obstacles and influence 
outcomes within its own region (Russett, et al., 2006 p. 98-99). This logic illuminates the 
reasoning behind many of Iran’s other political/security endeavors. The goal of Iran’s nuclear 
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program, for example, is not simply to acquire a nuclear weapon, but a means to achieve the 
influence associated with an asymmetric power advantage; i.e. achieving great-power status 
(Juneau, 2009, p.27). Once again this foreign policy objective coincides directly with the pursuit 
of regional hegemony. By building its sphere of influence within the Persian Gulf, Iran will be 
able to increase international community’s perception of its power. Overall, Iran’s goals follow 
on its desire to be recognized as a legitimate regional power and limit the role of other powers in 
its own region (Juneau, 2009, p.27). 
 The final foreign policy objective that is pushing the Iranian regime towards the pursuit 
of regional hegemony is predicated on its desire to influence the political and security 
developments of the Persian Gulf. In this area Iran’s focus is to promote an ideology that is able 
to capture broad regional support while still maintaining its position as a counterweight to the 
United States. Currently, Iran is expanding its political, economic, diplomatic, and military ties 
to its neighboring states as well as other regions with specific attention focused on the other 
Persian Gulf States, strategic actors in the Middle East, and other global powers who are 
ideologically opposed to the United States (Reut Institute, 2007). Overall, Iran is concerned with 
protecting both territorial sovereignty as well as its economic resources (i.e. oil and natural gas) 
from imperial exploitation. By pursuing regional hegemony Iran can entrench itself as the 
region’s leader, concerned not only with its own political developments, but also the dynamics of 
the region at large.  
1.5—Policy Manifestations of the Pursuit of Regional Hegemony 
 Each of the desires presented above lead Iran to their ultimate foreign policy path of 
pursuing regional hegemony but the desires, in and of themselves, do not explain how it will 
achieve the end goal. Although this paper does not detail in depth each of the specific policies 
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Iran will employ in their attempt to achieve their regional aspirations, it is important to consider 
how new policies create conflict between Iran and other international actors, in this case the 
United States. The new regional strategy of the Islamic Republic threatens a variety of American 
international interests within the Middle East, but aspirations alone do not justify intervention in 
Iranian affairs. In this regard, it is important to consider the specific policy manifestations of 
attempting to gain regional hegemony. Subsequently, these actions can be examined in the 
context of applicable international law, to identify what, if any, legal justification exists for 
responses by the U.S. 
1.6—Fact Area One: Building An Iranian Security Umbrella 
 One area of Iranian policy directly associated with the state’s fill the Gulf’s leadership 
vacuum is the state’s attempt to gain an asymmetric power advantage in the region. A security 
umbrella over its own sovereign territory and other regional states is an essential component of 
Iran’s hegemonic aspirations. Because Iran is somewhat deficient in terms of its conventional 
forces, Saudi Arabia has a larger military with more modern capabilities; the state has focused 
instead on building an asymmetric power advantage though a nuclear weapons program 
(Cordesman, 2004, p.325 and 333). Although the Iranian regime publicly maintains that the 
reason the state is “developing a nuclear program is to generate electricity without dipping into 
its oil supply…and to provide fuel for medical reactors,” there is general consensus throughout 
the international community that the program’s underlying goal is to develop weapons of mass 
destruction (NYT, 2011).  
1.61—Overview of the Program  
 Iran’s current nuclear infrastructure can be credited primarily to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
Iran’s current supreme leader (i.e. head of the religious institutions within the Islamic Republic, 
Siegel, 32 
and de-facto head of government/state). Since becoming Iran’s Supreme Leader in 1989, 
Ayatollah Khamenei has held a favorable view of the potential benefits (i.e. energy and military 
technology) of a strong nuclear program; working to increase research and development of 
nuclear technology, and expand the network of nations willing to support Iran in its nuclear 
pursuit. Specifically, Khamenei has fostered relationships with the governments of Russia, 
China, Pakistan and North Korea for nuclear assistance. Russia, for example, completed the 
construction of two 950-megawatt light-water reactors at Bushehr in 2009, and continues to 
supply the fuel that powers the nuclear reactors (Bruno, 2010, p.2) 
 Iran’s nuclear program extends throughout the large country with a vast network of 
“uranium mines, enrichment plants, conversion sites, and research reactors” (about twelve of 
which are considered major nuclear sites) (Bruno, 2010, p.3) Each of the major sites employs as 
many as 3000 nuclear scientists and is one link in the complex chain of facilities Iran is currently 
utilizing to pursue its nuclear ambitions. Some of the most important of these sites are 
enumerated below.  
1.62—Nuclear Facilities  
 The Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center is the headquarters of Iran's uranium-conversion 
efforts, “where approximately 366 tons of uranium hexafluoride has been produced since March 
2004” (Bruno, 2010, p.3) This “feedstock” is fed into centrifuges at the next important nuclear 
site: the Natanz enrichment facility where centrifuges purchased from Pakistan spin uranium 
hexafluoride at great speeds to increase the percentage of Uranium-235 (Bruno, 2010, p.3). 
Uranium-235, the principle component for nuclear power production (meeting Iran’s energy 
objectives), is also the main ingredient for weapons capability, subsequently used to produce 
weapons-grade uranium; uranium with a concentration of the uranium-235 isotope above 90 
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percent (Bruno, 2010, p.3) According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is not 
currently capable of enriching uranium to this level (i.e. the state is only able to produce low-
enriched uranium), but Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior fellow for nonproliferation at the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, says “if Iran were to stockpile sufficient LEU [low-
enriched uranium] they would be able to produce 
25 kg of weapons-grade uranium for production 
of a single bomb ‘within a couple of months’” 
(Bruno, 2010, p.3). In addition to the Natanz 
enrichment facility, a second (substantially 
smaller) facility is now under construction near 
Qom. The capacity of this facility is only about 
3000 centrifuge machines (Bruno, 2010, p.1). 
Senior American officials in the Obama 
Administration described the facility in this way: 
“[It is] not a large enough number to make any 
sense from a commercial standpoint…but if you want to use the facility in order to produce a 
small amount of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a bomb or two a year, it's the right size” 
(The White House, 2009). In addition to these three facilitates, the Iranian network of nuclear 
cites includes a number of other locations that range from uranium mines to weapons testing 
centers (e.g Bushehr), and heavy water plants (e.g. Arak) (BBC, 2012). The network stretches 
across the country from major cities to remote outposts, and while each facility has vastly 
different duties each is an essential part of the supply chain necessary to build a bomb.  
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1.63—International Opinion  
 Today Iran’s nuclear program is characterized primarily by international skepticism 
regarding its overarching intentions (i.e. energy objectives or military goals). From the 
perspective of most Western states including the U.S., intelligence already demonstrates that 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions are not peaceful. According to State Department spokesman Richard 
Boucher, “[the United States] believes Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce 
fissile material for nuclear weapons” (Bruno, 2010, p.3). Other members of the international 
community have also expressed concern over the Iranian admission that it has hidden aspects of 
the program from IAEA inspections, specifically the construction of the enrichment facility in 
Qom (IAEA, 2003, p.1-3). According to IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei, “Iran has 
not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues...which need to be 
clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear 
program” (IAEA, 2003, p.1) While, the IAEA inspectors have never discovered concrete 
evidence of a nuclear weapon, the IAEA has concluded that Iran has failed to meet its 
obligations under the Safeguards Agreement of 1974 and other specific applications of the NPT 
(Bruno, 2010, p.3-4).   
1.64—Context within Regional Aspirations  
 Iran’s nuclear program fits directly into its regional aspirations in an attempt to increase 
the state’s hard power advantage, build an international support base for its regional efforts, and 
divert attention away from domestic problems. First, in terms of hard power, Iran already holds a 
conventional advantage relative to most of the other Gulf States (Saudi Arabia has similar 
capabilities), but the potential acquisition of a nuclear weapon would cement Iran’s position as 
the most powerful state in the region (Cordesman, 2004, p.255-278). A nuclear weapon would 
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also mitigate (to some extent) the existential threat posed by both Israel and the United States. 
Next, Iran’s nuclear program depicts the willingness of other developed states to assist Iran in 
their pursuit of a nuclear weapon as well as their attempt to gain regional hegemony. Iran has 
received nuclear training and support as well as advanced weapons systems technology from 
global powers such as China, North Korea, and Russia (Cordesman, et al., 2010, p.5). Finally, as 
Iran’s nuclear program continues to receive immense backlash from the West, the Iranian 
government is able to divert public pressure away from domestic problems. As explained above, 
international condemnation of Iran’s domestic affairs create an “us vs. them” mentality, 
bolstering the current regime’s legitimacy. Overall, Iran’s growing nuclear program plays a key 
role in the state’s regional aspirations. 
1.7—Fact Area Two: Iranian Treatment of Civil and Political Society  
1.71—Civil and Political Society in Iran 
 A second area of state action that coincides with Iran’s new regional strategy is the 
regime’s treatment of its citizens in the context of civil and political society. It may seem that 
this fact area is very different from the other two examined in this paper, i.e. unlike the state’s 
attempt to build a nuclear weapon and support of international terrorism, the Iranian regime’s 
treatment of civil and political society seems to have only an indirect correlation with regional 
aspirations. The regime’s suppression of dissidence, however, is entirely linked to its pursuit of 
regional hegemony and subsequent tendency to promote international conflict. According to 
Andrew Moravcsik, regimes that crackdown on the fundamental freedoms of their citizens are 
able to avoid policies that reflect the beliefs of domestic groups (Moravcsik, 1995, p.158). In this 
regard, authoritarian regimes that violate human rights, are less venerable to being constrained 
by internal demands for cooperation and are much more likely to engage in international 
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hostility. In this case of Iran, crackdowns on human right enable the regime to avoid working to 
better the situation of citizens by participating in an increasingly globalized world. Instead the 
regime engages in hostile policies that further the goal of regional hegemony, but increases the 
chance that Iran will be involved in a large-scale international conflict (Moravcsik, 1995, p.158). 
 For over a decade, Iran’s domestic politics have been characterized by an internal 
struggle between reformers and those loyal to the revolutionary regime (BBC, 2011). Flashpoints 
in this ongoing clash include pro-democracy demonstrations in 1999 at Tehran University, 
protests against the clerical regime in 2003, and the Green Movement’s response to the 
reelection of President Ahmadinejad in 2009 (BBC, 2011). Each of these instances illustrates the 
underlying conditions of governance within the Islamic Republic, namely a constant threat to the 
power of the current regime. To shut down this internal dissidence, the revolutionary government 
often employs tactics that are condemned by other nations as well as international law.  
 Iran is most often criticized for its treatment of nationals with regard to each of the 
following areas: (1) torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment including 
flogging and amputations; (2) widespread use of the death penalty, public executions, execution 
of juvenile offenders, and stoning as a method of execution; (3) woman’s rights; (4) rights of 
minorities (including freedom of religion for religious minorities); (5) freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association and freedom of opinion and expression (e.g. protests following the 
illegitimate reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009); (6) lack of due process 
rights including arbitrary arrest, detention and unfair trials (HRC, 2011, p. 3-14 and Clinton, 
2011). An interim report to the Secretary-General the UN Human Rights Council presented a 
bleak portrait of the situation of human rights in Iran, and any prospects for improvement, 
claiming that “the human rights situation in Iran has been marked by an intensified crackdown 
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on human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, journalists and government opponents” 
(HRC, 2011, p.1). 
1.72—Context within Regional Aspirations  
 While it is more difficult to directly connect Iran’s human rights violations to its regional 
aspirations than other policies like the nuclear program, the often-inhumane treatment of 
nationals is directly tied to the revolutionary government’s attempt to maintain its power. 
Utilizing  "torture, cruel, or degrading treatment of detainees, [and] the imposition of the death 
penalty in the absence of proper judicial safeguards” the regime actively works to crackdown on 
internal challenges and suppress dissidence (Charbonneau, 2011 & Clinton, 2011). In response to 
the illegitimate reelection of President Ahmadinejad in 2009, for example, between forty and 
eighty people were killed and as many as four thousand jailed in crackdowns on protests 
organized by Iran’s pro-reform Green Movement (Anderson, 2010, p.1 and HRW, 2010, p.8). It 
is also important to note that these harsh governmental responses prompt the use of diversionary 
international politics (as explained above).   
1.8—Fact Area Three: Iranian Power Politics 
 A third area of Iranian policy that benefits Iran’s new regional objectives is the attempt to 
build a base of state’s, groups, and individuals that are ideologically aligned with the Islamic 
Republic. In order to achieve its goal of hegemony in the Persian Gulf system, Iran must seek 
external backing and support. In this regard, Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony has 
manifestations within the Persian Gulf and beyond. While Iran is also in the process of building 
alliances with other states ideologically opposed to the United States throughout the world (e.g. 
Venezuela, North Korea, and China), the state has primarily utilized a projection of its power 
through the support of international terrorism to build this external support. This section 
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specifically explores two instances of Iran’s connection to international terrorism within the 
Middle East; the state’s participation in the Iran-Syria-Hizballah triangle and its support of 
Hamas. Additionally, I identify one new example of Iran’s support of terrorism outside of the 
Middle East.  
1.81—Regional Power Politics  
 Despite the regional schisms between Iran and the Arab states, nearly all of the Muslim 
countries in the Middle East (and world at large) have found common ground in their opposition 
to the state of Israel. While each state differs in its rhetoric and policy towards Israel, there is 
broad agreement that that state is illegitimate and guilty of crimes against the Muslim world. 
Rejection of policies and the right of the Jewish State to exist, therefore, provides Iran with an 
issue capable of invoking pan-Islamic support (Fuller, 2007, p.144). By supporting states and 
organizations working to perpetually antagonize Israel, Iran can entrench itself as a modern 
leader in the long fight against the Jewish State. This position allows Iran to bridge the gaps of 
regional cleavages (e.g. Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Persian), by promoting cooperation through a 
common enemy (Amidror, 2007, p.3-4).  
 Since its inception in the early 1980’s, Iran has utilized Hizballah as its primary 
mechanism for antagonizing Israel. Iran’s support of Hizballah, also involves Syria, which serves 
as the physical bridge between Iran and Lebanon for weapons, fighters, and money. The Iran-
Syria-Hizballah triangle formed on the basis of three crosscutting interests shared by the three 
actors. First, all three have fear of internal and external delegitimization (Amidror, 2007, p.3). By 
participating in the triangle, each is able to expand its regional power and influence and 
subsequent importance to the Middle East system. Second, each fears that external entities will 
prevent them from achieving their regional interests (Amidror, 2007, p.3). By taking the lead in 
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the modern fight against Israel (along with Hamas and other Palestinian organizations), all three 
align their goals with other powerful Middle Eastern states, preventing world powers from 
subjugating them individually. Finally, there is shared understanding among the three actors that 
by working together they can achieve many more of their goals than they can alone (Amidror, 
2007, p.3). All three remain involved in the triangle as a means of achieving the objectives 
presented above, but they also receive external benefits on the basis of their individual positions. 
 Since Hizballah was founded, Iran has provided for the organization’s financial, training, 
and weapons needs (Cordesman, 2006, p.2). It is important to note that Hizballah is not an 
Iranian proxy (it is for the most part politically independent from Iran). Nevertheless, there is no 
question that the party-cum-militia would not have been able to achieve its current power 
without Iranian assistance. On an annual basis, Iran provides $25-50 million in financial and 
military support to Hizballah. According to Daniel Byman, the Iran-Hizballah relationship is the 
strongest and most effective relationship between a state sponsor and a terrorist group in history 
(Cordesman, 2006, p.3 and Byman, 2008, 172). Syria has also played a part in the triangle in an 
effort to boost its power and subsequent regional position. A fellow member of the Bush 
administration’s “axis of evil” with Iran, Syria boosted its alliance with the Islamic Republic, 
building up its long-term military capabilities through the acquisition of Iranian weapons and 
placing itself under Iran’s security umbrella. While the alliance greatly benefits the long-term 
goals of both Hizballah and Syria, for the purpose of this paper, the triangle is most important as 
a manifestation of Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony, allowing the Islamic Republic to take a 
leadership role antagonizing Israel.   
 Beyond Iran’s participation in the Iran-Syria-Hizballah triangle the Islamic Republic also 
supports Hamas, the Sunni-Palestinian socio-political organization currently controlling the Gaza 
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Strip. Like Iran’s support of Hizballah, support of Hamas helps Iran to cultivate the pan-Islamic 
support for its regional objectives based on the idea that resisting the state of Israel is a pan-
Islamic source of pride (Haaretz, 12/9/2008). President Ahmadinejad has publicly pledged 
Iranian support of Hamas, telling its leader Ismail Haniyeh that Iran will stand behind the 
Palestinian people until the collapse of the Zionist regime (Haaretz, 12/9/2008). Support for 
Hamas from Iran has taken the form of humanitarian aid (e.g. food, medical equipment, and 
construction supplies), financial assistance, and arms transfers to support militant operations 
against Israel (Adkins et al., 2010). According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Iran provides 
Hamas with between $20-30 million worth of assistance annually (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2009, p.3). Iranian ties to Hamas differ from its ties to Hizballah, however, because Hamas is a 
Sunni organization. While Iran shares inherent cultural ties to Hizballah, Iran’s relationship with 
Hamas places Iran at the heart of a traditionally Sunni struggle (the plight of the Palestinians). In 
this regard, Iran’s connection to Hamas may be the most important connection Iran has in the 
Middle East, in terms of proving that it is capable of leadership across cultural cleavages.  In 
Iran’s view, a positive relationship with Hamas has the potential to draw in other Sunni 
movements (Kramer, 2007, p.16).  
1.82—International Power Politics  
 Beyond the support of external terrorist organizations within the Middle East, Iran has 
also participated in direct state-sponsored international terrorism elsewhere in the world. On 
October 13th, 2011 American intelligence uncovered a plot to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador 
to the United States. In a statement the same day, President Obama said the U.S. had significant 
evidence that high ranking Iranian officials were complicit in the scheme that involved Iran 
conspiring with a Mexican Drug cartel to kill the ambassador (Cooper, 2011, p.1). Although this 
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direct involvement in a terror plot is less common than the indirect support Iran provided groups 
like Hizballah and Hamas, it nonetheless serves the same foreign policy objectives on an 
international level (explained below). 
1.83—Context within Regional Aspirations  
 For decades, Israel has been considered a proxy of the United States by nearly all of the 
Muslim regimes in the Middle East. While the inability of the Arab states to coalesce into a 
unified front against the Jewish state has allowed Israel to strengthen its regional position, it has 
also opened the door for Iran to step in. In order to achieve its goal of regional hegemony, Iran 
seeks to take a leadership role in the struggle against Israel and rejection to the imperial presence 
of the United States (the most unifying Islamic causes within the region). The support of terrorist 
organizations plays a vital role in the Islamic Republic’s attempt to demonstrate to its regional 
counterparts that it is capable of bridging cultural cleavages (between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims) 
and take a pan-Islamic leadership role. Since he took office, President Ahmadinejad has made 
anti-Israel discourse a central tenet of Iranian foreign policy. It is highly unlikely that Iran would 
ever actually pursue militarily the destruction of the state of Israel, but support of Hizballah and 
Hamas allows Iran to maintain a low level of pressure on Israel at all times painting Iran as a 
leader against the Zionist entity (Cordesman, 2006, p.2). This foreign policy path is strengthened 
through Iran’s support of Hamas, not just because the organization provides Iran a support base 
for attacks against Israel, but also because it shows that the Islamic Republic’s actions are not 
exclusively Shi’ite nor are they anti-Sunni (Fuller, 2007, p.148). In addition, new international 
terrorism, like the plot against the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, allows Iran to more 
directly target the United States. In the words of President Ahmadinejad “rather than responding 
passively to the U.S. attempt to isolate Iran politically and economically and become the 
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dominant player in the Middle East region, Iran’s backyard, Iran should move aggressively in the 
U.S.’s own backyard as a means to rattle it or at least make a point” (Karmon, 2009, p.2). 
Overall, Iran’s support of international terrorism illustrates the state’s ability to take a leadership 
role against the U.S. on both regional and ideological playing fields.  
1.9—The United States and Iran 
1.91—A Crash Course for Conflict   
 While the current geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf may seem to present 
promising conditions for Iran’s desire to fill the region’s leadership vacuum, each of the policy 
manifestations of the state’s pursuit of regional hegemony are extremely concerning United 
States. As the global hegemon, the U.S. is state most equipped to stand in the way of Iran’s 
regional aspirations and poised to do so in light of provocative Iranian policies. The Iranian 
nuclear program, for instance, threatens American global security and energy interests in the 
Middle East (Bruno, 2010). Iran’s support of international terrorism is equally concerning as 
military, financial, and logistically support funneled to the Levant are used against the principal 
American ally in the region, Israel, on a daily basis. Finally, while they do not directly impact the 
United States, Iran’s offensive treatment of its civil and political societies flies in the face of 
many foundational American values (State Department, 2012). At this point it is clear that if 
Iranian policy in each of these areas maintains its current trajectory, the two states will position 
themselves on a crash course for conflict with one another, if they have not already.  
1.92—American Domestic Political Debate and the “Iranian Question” 
 In terms of American domestic politics, there is quite possibly no more divisive and 
prevalent foreign policy topic than how the United States should deal with the “Iranian 
Question.” The hot-button issue has dominated the Republican presidential primary season, 
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surpassing the American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. The nuclear issue, in particular, has 
consumed much of this discussion as academics and politicians alike debate the geopolitical 
implications of an Iranian state with an atomic bomb at its disposal. Although both Republicans 
and Democrats are opposed to the current trajectory of the Iranian nuclear program (i.e. the 
pursuit of a bomb), debate on the Iranian Question breaks down along party lines.  
 On one side of the Iranian question are Republicans, who have taken a hawkish hard-line 
stance, arguing that sanctions and diplomacy will be unsuccessful in an American effort to 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Republican presidential candidate and current 
frontrunner, Governor Mitt Romney, argues that the message of American willingness to use 
military action against the Islamic Republic should be demonstrated through action; “The United 
States should restore the regular presence of aircraft carrier task forces in both the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf region simultaneously…. increase military coordination, 
assistance and enhance intelligence sharing [with Israel]…. and increase military coordination 
with our Arab allies” to demonstrate that Iran’s nuclear-weapons program is “unacceptable” 
(Romney for President, 2012). Democrats, on the other hand, have taken a less militaristic 
approach stressing the need to exhaust all other foreign policy options before resorting to force. 
While President Obama has refused to take the strike scenario off the table, he and his 
administration argue “sustained and aggressive diplomacy combined with tough sanctions should 
be our primary means to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons” (Elsner et al., 2008).  
1.10—Concluding Remarks   
 Although party leaders differ in what they see as the best strategy for dealing with Iran’s 
regional hegemonic aspirations moving forward, there are almost no American politicians calling 
for decreased foreign policy engagement with the Islamic Republic. It is clear that today the two 
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states are on a crash course for conflict with one another as Iranian policy manifestations of their 
regional goals continue to be met with American condemnation and pressure. In this regard, 
there is no more pertinent foreign policy discussion than one dealing with potential foreign 
policy actions the U.S. has at its disposal to respond to these provocative Iranian policies. Before 
theses actions can be examined, however, it is necessary to turn our attention to the one 
crosscutting lens capable of analyzing and justifying state action, international law. In the next 
Part of this paper, I explain why international law must play a larger role in American foreign 
policy discourse surrounding Iran. Subsequently, in Part 3, I discuss the Iranian violations of 
international law that give rise to legal American foreign policy responses. Finally, in Part 4 and 
5, I provide a much more detailed account of each of these potential foreign policy strategies and 
their context within American domestic political debate as well as an analysis of their legality.  
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Part 2: International Law—A New Framework of Analysis 
2.1—International Law and the “Iranian Question” 
 While the prevalence of the “Iranian Question” in political debate continues to increase, 
debate on American foreign policy responses to Iranian hostility has lacked serious discussion of 
international law. Strike scenarios (which will be examined in great detail in Part 4), for instance, 
are most often examined in terms of military readiness, i.e. What type of bunker-busting missile 
is needed? Will the strike succeed? What type of Iranian response would be expected? Blatantly 
ignored in public discussion, however, is the context of how this type of drastic action conforms 
to American international legal obligations. Although it is sometimes rhetorically noted that 
Iranian actions are illegal under international law, e.g. calling Iranian treatment of civil and 
political society “human rights violations,” legality is almost never considered when discussing 
how the United States will respond. This lack of legal perspective, while ultimately detrimental 
(for a number of reasons explored below), can be traced to a number of legitimate concerns with 
international law that permeate many foreign policy debates. These concerns do not, however, 
mitigate the benefits of allowing international law to take a much more predominate role in 
American foreign policy discourse on Iran.  
2.2—Perceived Shortcomings of International Law  
 When compared to domestic law,  “international law has long been viewed with 
suspicion in Anglo-American legal thought” (Goldsmith & Levinson, 2009, p.1792). Since 
international law governs the relationship between individually sovereign entities (i.e. states), it 
is a voluntary system in which states must consent before they are bound (Goldsmith & 
Levinson, 2009, p.1793). Constitutional law (the American domestic legal system), by contrast, 
is an “overarching framework” with all of the necessary institutions to create, enforce, and 
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reevaluate legal principles. This dichotomy allows critics of international law to ask whether it is 
even possible for a body of laws to exist that governs the relations between sovereign states.  
 Beyond this existential question, international law also lacks three legal structures that 
allow laws to function in most societies making the system seem deficient. First, there is no true 
international legislature/law-making authority (Goldsmith & Levinson, 2009, p.1792). 
International law is the product of treaties, statutes and customary/general principles, none of 
which are the direct result of any all-inclusive legislative body. Second, there is no international 
executive/centralized enforcement agency (Goldsmith & Levinson, 2009, p.1792).  Rather than 
an umbrella organization responsible for policing wrongdoing, enforcement of international law 
falls to the member states who seek reparations for wrongs of which they were the targets. 
Finally, there is no effective international judiciary with compulsory/binding jurisdiction to settle 
disputes between states (Goldsmith & Levinson, 2009, p.1792).  Although two international 
courts exist, the International Court of Justice (which deals with state on state disputes) and the 
more recent International Criminal Court (which prosecutes individuals for international crimes), 
states only come under the jurisdiction of the courts after they have given consent. In this regard, 
states can avoid prosecution for international wrongdoing by not submitting to the authority of 
the court. When it is measured against these three benchmarks, international law appears 
deficient in each dimension and is, therefore, often ignored in political debate (Goldsmith & 
Levinson, 2009, p.1792).  
2.3—The Role of International Law: A Framework of Analysis  
 Although international law certainly has its shortcomings, there are a number of 
important reasons it should still play a primary role in the American political debate on the 
“Iranian Question.” International law remains the most effective framework to examine the 
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relations between the two states, serving as a lens through which foreign policy responses to the 
hostile/inflammatory policies (enumerated above) can be evaluated in terms of their legality, 
necessity, and even chances of success. In this section, I explore three of the primary reasons for 
utilizing international law as the primary framework for this paper and argue that legal 
commitments must play a larger role in the American political debate on Iran. This discussion 
sets the stage for the remainder of the paper that empirically deals with how current Iranian 
policies conform to the state’s international obligations and subsequently the legality of 
American responses.  
2.31—International Law and American Global Public Relations  
 One of the most important reasons the United States must consider international law in 
crafting foreign policy towards Iran is derived from a lesson the United States has learned from 
previous international action—action deemed by the international community to be illegal. The 
connection between the image of the United States and international law is difficult to explicitly 
determine, but there is no doubt that the perception of the U.S. has taken a substantial hit since 
September 11th, 2001. Without question, one of the most influential policies in accounting for 
this decline in popularity is the War in Iraq, which was official condemned by over 50 UN 
member states (BBC, 2003). 
 Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the 
“United States would undermine international law and order if it decide[d] to attack Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein without United Nations approval [i.e. authorization making the use of 
force a legal foreign policy action],” denouncing the Bush administrations’ “go-it-alone” 
approach to global affairs (Witt, 2002). Although this paper will not offer an analysis of whether 
or not the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was legal under international law, President Bush’s decision 
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to invade without first receiving UNSC authorization led many critics to condemn the war as a 
blatant violation of American international obligations (Burkeman & Borger, 2003). Ultimately, 
the war contributed to a serious decline in the international image of the United States, the 
effects of which are still being felt today. According to the Pew Research Center, although the 
global image of the U.S. has improved slightly since the Obama administration assumed office in 
2009, America’s favorability rating today is as low as 17% in Middle Eastern States such as 
Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan (PRC, 2010). Even in Western European nations that are traditional 
allies, the U.S. took a significant public relations hit between 2000-2010. In the United 
Kingdom, favorability decreased from 83% to 65%, with the most significant drop (15%) 
coming in the immediate aftermath of the start of the Iraq War, 2003-2004. Germany shares 
similar statistics, with an overall decrease from 78% to 63% and favorability dropping all the 
way to 30% in the final year of the Bush administration (PRC, 2010).  
 The United States may not have suffered legal repercussions for the invasion of Iraq to 
date, but the state’s decision to pursue a foreign policy action that many states perceived as 
illegal has had many negative consequences.  By defying their opinions, the Bush administration 
alienated many American allies and demonstrated its belief that American national interests 
would take precedence over international law (Ikenberry, 2003, p.533). This was subsequently 
detrimental to any attempt at multilateralism in Iraq, and the United States was essentially left to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein and rebuild the state on its own. The choice to act unilaterally, i.e. 
without waiting for international backing, undermined the credibility of the United States from 
the Middle East to Western Europe (PRC, 2004). A number of traditional American allies in 
Europe even expressed a desire for “foreign policy and security arrangements independent from 
the United States” (PRC, 2004). Acting without UNSC approval also contributed to international 
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sentiment that the Untied States was fighting a “War on Islam” in the post-9/11 world. The 
invasion of Iraq casts doubts about the true American motives behind the “War on Terrorism,” 
especially as time passed and the U.S. forces searched in vein for WMDs, boosting anti-
American sentiment in the Middle East (PRC, 2004). According to the Pew Research Center, 
majorities of Muslims in Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey (all of the nations surveyed), 
doubted the sincerity of the War on Terrorism. Most instead saw the Iraq War as another attempt 
by the United States to seize control of oil resources and “dominate the world” (PRC, 2004). 
Ultimately it its clear that U.S. unilateral action without legal authorization by the United 
Nations was extremely detrimental to American international image. While it may seem, on face, 
to be only a public relations issue, the actions that sparked international anti-American sentiment 
also contributed to the fracturing of relationships with traditional allies, sparked distrust of 
American international objectives, and made future multilateral action more difficult.  
2.32—Reevaluating the Perceived “Deficiencies” of International Law 
 Despite the perceived inadequacies of international law, in reality the development of an 
international legal system has radically changed the way states interact with one another. 
Although the international legal system is made up of dynamic, bottom-up contracts that are 
constantly being created between states, the end product governs behavior in the same way as its 
top-down domestic counterpart. While international law lacks a legislature, executive, and 
judiciary, in the traditional senses of the terms, it has other mechanisms that guide, restrain, and 
regulate the behavior of states (just as domestic laws act upon citizens) (Damrosch, et al., 2009, 
p.7). Treaties between states, for instance, take the place of legislation as states submit 
themselves to certain standards governing their action henceforth. Just as a citizen of any state 
enters into a social contract that restricts their personal sovereignty (i.e. a citizen of the United 
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States is legal obligated to refrain from killing another person, except in certain circumstances), 
treaties restrict some of the sovereignty of the signatory (Damrosch, et al., 2009, p.10). 
Additionally, since international law cannot be viewed in a vacuum independent of international 
politics, an enforcement mechanism is derived from the desire for states to maintain a good 
reputation, protect national interests, and/or avoid security repercussions. While, like any other 
legal system, international law is not effective one hundred percent of the time, as Louis Hankin 
famously said, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law almost and 
all of their obligations almost all of the time” (Damrosch, et al., 2009, p.7). Even if, however, 
American policymakers question the existential legitimacy of international law, so long as much 
of the international order continues to utilize its institutions and develop its principles, U.S. 
action will be evaluated through a “legal” lens. In this regard, if international law is perceived 
only as a moral code, illegal/immoral action will continue to be met with international 
condemnation and the same difficulties for the United States illustrated above.  
2.33—International Law and American Values  
 A final reason that it is beneficial to the United States to consider foreign policy in the 
context of international law is the promotion of American ideals. Whereas many policymakers, 
including the neoliberal Bush administration, believed that the United States could assert its 
values through force, others have argued that it is in fact an adherence to American international 
obligations that is the best mechanism to promote those principles Americans hold dear. 
According to Mary Ellen O’Connell of Notre Dame Law School, a recommitment to the 
international legal responsibilities of the United States in both political discourse and foreign 
policy action is the best way to spread American ideals globally. In O’Connell’s view, 
international law, which embraces American values of democracy, freedom, and justice, is “the 
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right vehicle to advance these values for a rule-of-law-based nation like the United States” (IHT, 
2007). A foreign policy, therefore, that includes “a recommitment to the means and ends of 
international law would pay enormous dividends for our nation [the U.S.] and our world” (IHT, 
2007). Additionally, in terms of American Exceptionalism, so long as the United States 
continues to evaluate the hostile/inflammatory actions of other states through a legal lens (e.g. 
condemning Iranian treatment of civil/political society as human rights violations), the United 
States must hold its own action to the same standard. Although international law has been largely 
ignored when examining the Iranian Question, when it has surfaced, it has been utilized 
exclusively to condemn Iranian action. Following the thwarted November 2011 assassination 
plot, for instance, President Obama called the Saudi Ambassador to express his solidarity and 
articulate the American position that the scheme constituted a “flagrant violation of U.S. and 
international law” (Savage & Shane, 2011). In this regard, if the United States intends to utilize 
Iranian “breaches of its international obligations” as a justification for future intervention, 
potential American responses must conform to international law as well.  
2.4—Concluding Remarks 
 Like any other nation, the U.S. will no doubt make mistakes when it comes to acting 
within the confines of its international legal obligations. The United States should still, however, 
do everything in its power to act within international law moving forward. Specifically, 
international law must play a much greater role in the American foreign policy discourse on the 
“Iranian Question,” if the United States wants to build multilateral support for action and avoid a 
public relations debacle similar to the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. Later in this paper, I 
present the relevant international law necessary for this debate and explore how the U.S. can go 
about crafting, legal foreign action towards provocative Iranian policies. Before we can examine 
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the legal foreign policy responses the United States has at its disposal to respond to provocative 
Iranian action, however, it is necessary to explore how current Iranian policies conform to the 
state’s own international legal obligations. This analysis provides a foundation for analyzing the 
legality of potential American responses; since legal obligations are dependant on the specific 
circumstances a state finds itself in. 
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Part 3: Iranian Violations of International Law 
4.1—Introduction of Violations  
 Although they fit into Iran’s current national objectives on both the domestic and 
international levels, many of the policies enumerated in Part 1 do not conform to the state’s 
obligations under international law. In this section, I consider each of the four policy areas above 
in the applied context of international law. Although this section will only provide in depth 
analysis for Iran’s most egregious breaches of international law, a comprehensive list of all 
violations can be found in the appendices A-E of this paper.  
4.2—Nuclear Program  
 Iran’s primary breaches of its international obligations with regard to the state’s nuclear 
program come in violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its adjoining 
Safeguards Agreement (the state-specific addendum to the NPT in accordance with Art. 3(1)). 
The NPT is “a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete 
disarmament” (UN, 2002). Opened for signature on July 1st, 1968, the treaty was signed by Iran 
the same day, and entered into force on March 5th, 1970 (UN, 2002). Today the NPT is the only 
binding commitment in the form of a multilateral treaty aimed at nuclear disarmament and future 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by signatories. Under the NPT, all signatories have the 
“inalienable right” to pursue nuclear technology for civilian energy production, but states may 
not utilize fissile material for weapons of any kind (UN, 2002).  
 Overall, the NPT advances three essential pillars with regard to the future of nuclear 
energy and weapons—non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy—each 
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of which is violated by the current Iranian nuclear program (UN, 2002). Iran’s violations of the 
NPT are primarily based on Article 3(1), which states that parties to the convention will not 
divert the production of nuclear energy for peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other explosive 
devices. As explained in Part 1 of this paper, it is clear that Iran’s current nuclear program 
extends beyond the production of peaceful energy, as the state continues to engage in practices 
that are exclusively useful in the production of atomic weaponry such as uranium enrichment 
(conversion), laser isotope enrichment experiments, and plutonium experiments (White House, 
2009). In addition, Iran’s failure to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) violates both the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement. Also in breach of Article 3(1), Iran 
has failed to report the existence of several nuclear sites to the IAEA (e.g. an enrichment facility 
at the Kalaye Electric Company Workshop and laser enrichment plants at the Tehran Nuclear 
Research Center and at Lashkar Ab’ad) as well as the construction of new facilities (e.g. Qom) 
(Shire & Albright, 2006, p.2). Finally, in violation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the state has 
failed to declare and report a number of other nuclear related activities including uranium 
imports and transfer, processing and use of uranium, reactor information, uranium conversion 
experiments, importation and use of other nuclear materials and design information of nuclear-
related facilities to the IAEA (Kerr, 2011, p.12).  
 Beyond the NPT and Safeguards Agreement, Iran is also a party to four other multilateral 
agreements that provide legal regulations on the state’s nuclear program. Iran is currently not in 
violation of three of these treaties; the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA 
(P&I), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (NOT), and the Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (ASSIST). Iran is, 
however, in violation of the Revised Supplemental Agreement Concerning Provisions of 
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Technical Assistance by the IAEA (RSA). Article 3(1) of the RSA, which reaffirms Article 3(2) 
of the NPT, stipulates that states may not utilize nuclear energy research and development for the 
production of nuclear weapon. As stated above and confirmed in the most recent IAEA report on 
Iran’s nuclear activities, Iran has carried out a number of activities exclusively related to the 
development of a nuclear weapon and explosive devises (IAEA, 2011, p.8). Ultimately, it is clear 
that Iran’s current nuclear program is in violation of international law and the state is not 
attempting to conform to its international legal obligations. For a comprehensive list of all 
Iranian violations of the NPT, Safeguards Agreement, and RSA see Appendix A.  
4.3—Human Rights Violations  
 In terms of human rights, Iran is currently engaged in a number of practices that violate 
international law. In this area, Iran’s legal obligations are derived primarily from the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). Together these three accords make up an unofficial “international bill of rights” 
intended to protect “fundamental freedoms” and “human rights” for all, in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter (which is binding on all states) (UN, 2007). Major Iranian violations in 
this area include, but are not limited to: cruel and unusual punishments, death sentences imposed 
on minors, arbitrary detention, persecution of minority religions/cultures/ethnicities and 
restrictions on freedom of association/speech/expression/privacy/information (NEPR, 2011, p.5-
18). For a comprehensive list of Iran’s human rights violations of international law see Appendix 
B. In addition to these breaches, however, it is important to call special attention to Iran’s 
treatment of women as well as its illegitimate manipulation of the political sphere, which both 
account for further infractions of international law.  
Siegel, 56 
 In modern Iran women are regarded as second-class citizens and are codified in law as 
the “inferior sex” (NEPR, 2011, p.5). Both treaties mentioned above, as well as the UDHR have 
special provisions concerned exclusively with the equality of women (ICCPR—Art. 3, 
ICESCR—Art. 3, and UDHR—Art. 2), but the current Iranian regime has simply ignored these 
obligations and continues to oppress females throughout the country. For this reason, I have 
devoted a separate appendix of this paper, Appendix E, exclusively to the official laws against 
women in the Iranian Constitution, Penal Code, and Civil Code. Article 209 of the Constitution, 
for instance, states that a women’s life is valued as only half as much as a man’s (if a man is 
convicted of murdering a women his only punishment is to pay the women’s family a ‘dayeh’ or 
stipulated sum of money). According to the Penal Code, penalties for women convicted of 
crimes are harsher than men convicted of the same offence. Moreover, the code stipulates that 
health care is to be entirely segregated on the basis of gender, which seriously compromises the 
health of women and girls since there are not enough health professionals trained in female 
issues (WFAFI, 2008, p.1-2). Overall, the treatment of women in Iran represents one of the 
state’s most egregious violations of its international obligations.  
 Finally, because of its strategic importance in terms of U.S. foreign policy responses to 
Iran (explained later), it is important to note the particular human rights violations that allow the 
current Iranian regime to maintain its power. According to Article 21(3) of the UDHR “the will 
of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held 
by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”  Although Iran does afford its citizens 
universal suffrage, recent national elections have demonstrated that the will of the Iranian people 
is not adequately reflected in the state’s governance. As alluded to above, the 2009 reelection of 
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President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was affected by significant fraud (Mebane, 2009, p.21). By 
ensuring that the people are unable to exercise supreme control over the state, the regime 
maintains its power allows for the perpetuation of human rights violations.  
4.4—Support of International Terrorism  
 The final policy area explored in this paper, Iran’s support of international terrorism, is 
also rife with violations of Iran’s obligations under international law. Before I endeavor to 
enumerate Iran’s breaches, however, it is important to consider how the international community 
defines “terrorism.” Although, terrorism (specifically international terrorism) has become one of, 
if not the most, dominant form of global conflict in the 21st century, currently there is no 
universally agreed upon definition of the term that is codified in international law. There are, 
however, two conventions on terrorism that carry broad support in the international community. 
Both the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT—proposed in 1996) and 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT—proposed 
in 1999) offer very similar definitions of the term. Both of these definitions can be viewed in 
their entirety in Appendix D. For the purpose of this paper, however, terrorism will be defined 
using the definition found in Art. 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT: to cause death or serious bodily injury to 
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act. Although Iran is not, there are 176 parties to the ICSFT and 132 states have 
ratified the convention (including the United States), giving the treaty the support of 70% of 
United Nations member states and making the conventions definition applicable in considering 
whether Iranian action constitutes international terrorism (i.e. as a customary principle). A third 
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source applicable in defining “international terrorism” for the purpose this paper, comes from the 
U.S. legal code, specifically Title 18-2331. This definition, which can also be viewed in its 
entirety in Appendix C, will be explored more in Part 4 of this paper.  
 Regardless of which of the three major definitions of “international terrorism” one 
applies to Iran’s current activities, it is clear that the state’s actions currently violate its 
international obligations. Most notably, Iran’s policy towards Hizballah and Hamas constitute 
egregious violations of Article 2 of the ICSFT and Article 1 of UN Security Council Resolution 
1373. As explained above, Iran is the primary financial backer Hizballah, providing the 
organization between $25-50 annually (Byman, 2008, p.172). Additionally, the state contributes 
between $20-30 million to Hamas each year (Byman, 2008, p.172).  Both of these groups are 
considered to be “foreign terrorist organizations” by the United States State Department, and 
both engage in actions that violate the ICSFT definition of terrorism (Department of State, 1999). 
Hizballah has on numerous occasions been condemned by members of the international 
community for intentionally targeting citizens in its attacks on Northern Israel (Byman, 2003, 
p.58). Hamas has been similarly criticized for its attacks (based in the Gaza Strip) on Southern 
Israeli townships (Adkins et al., 2010).  
 A final aspect of Iran’s violations of international law in the sphere of international 
terrorism comes in the October 2011 commissioned plot to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador to 
the United States by conspiring with a Mexican Drug cartel (Cooper, 2011, p.1). This action, 
which is in violation of Articles 1(a) and 2(a) of UNSC Res. 1373, differs from other Iranian 
support, in that it constituted a direct threat against the United States that was to be carried out on 
American soil. As will be explored later in the paper, this incident (and potential future incidents 
like it) provide the United States a deeper international legal backing for retaliatory actions 
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against the Islamic Republic since recent Iranian acts have been specifically aimed at the U.S. 
rather than its allies. For a comprehensive list of Iranian violations of international law with 
regard to the state’s support of international terrorism see Appendix C.  
4.5—Hostile Trade Policy 
 Beyond the three policy areas of current Iranian violations explored above, it is also 
important to note a fourth area of potential future violations; the state’s hostile trade policy. 
Although Iran is currently not in violation of 
international law with regard to the state’s 
control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, hostile 
national rhetoric—threats to close the waterway 
to international energy commerce—has 
increased. As explained above, Iran’s extremely 
powerful position on the North bank of the Strait 
affords the state the opportunity to regulate the flow of oil and natural gas in and out of the Gulf 
region. While Iran has not yet utilized this strategic position to prevent other nations from 
engaging in energy commerce in the region, the state has made threats to close the “choke-point” 
to Western nations (Breverton, 2010, p. 169). In December 2011, the Iranian navy participated in 
a ten-day set of war games in international waters near the Strait of Hormuz; a show of force 
intended to demonstrate Iran’s capability to close the strategic passage. Following the exercise, 
Iranian Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi “warned that ‘not a drop of oil will pass 
through the Strait of Hormuz’ if sanctions [against Iran] are widened” (BBC, 2011). Although it 
has not yet done so, closing the Strait to Western commerce would constitute another policy 
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manifestation of Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf, as the state retaliates 
against sanctions and demonstrates its control over the valuable resources of oil and natural gas.  
 Differing from the other policy areas explored in this paper Iran’s obligations under 
international law with regard to trade policy are derived exclusively from customary 
international law, i.e. “rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the 
belief that the law required them to act that way," rather than multilateral treaties and/or 
conventions (Rosenne, 1984, p. 55). Iran, like the U.S., has signed, but not ratified, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), the preeminent international agreement 
governing the worlds waterways. In addition, the state currently holds only observer status at the 
World Trade Organization. Although Iran submitted its application for official membership to 
the WTO in 1996 and the General Council established a working party to examine the 
application in 2005, the Working Party has not yet met (WTO, 2011). Since Iran has yet to 
illegally prevent commercial or navigational ship traffic through the strait, it is not in violation of 
customary international law in this area and is subsequently immune to legal retaliatory action by 
the U.S (or any other state) in this area. For more information on Iran and the Law of the Seas 
and WTO see Appendix D.  
4.6—Concluding Remarks  
 Today, Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony has translated into a number of egregious 
violations of the state’s international legal obligations. Elements of the state’s nuclear program, 
treatment of civil and political society, and attempt to project its power are inconsistent with the 
legal responsibilities of the Islamic Republic providing a legal basis justifying some American 
foreign policy responses. In the next two sections I turn my attention to these potential actions 
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and, in the context of both Iranian violations of and American obligations, identify which 
policies are currently legal under international law.  
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Part 4: American Use of Force 
4.1—Overview of the Use of Force 
 The first category of potential American foreign policy responses to the inflammatory 
Iranian policies and violations of international law is the use of force. Although there is no 
comprehensive definition of the “use of force” codified in international law, the modern 
conception of has come to mean the “broadest category related to war” (O’Connell, 2009).  
Although the term was understood somewhat more narrowly in drafting the United Nations 
Charter, including only physical violence between states, today the definition has expanded to 
include more modern manifestations of hostility. In Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ redefined 
use of force to encompass economic coercion, political coercion, physical force not including 
arms, and computer attacks (O’Connell, 2009, p.14).  In this section I will enumerate the current 
international law dealing with the use of force and explain how potential uses of force against 
Iran align with the international legal obligations of the United States.  Economic and political 
coercion, however, will be covered in Part 5 of this paper, which deals exclusively with 
American sanctions policy towards Iran. In the end, I argue that although Iran is currently 
engaged in a number of policies that breach its international obligations, the only use of force by 
the United States that is currently legal under international law is cyber-attacks against Iranian 
nuclear infrastructure.  
4.2—Context within American Domestic Politics  
 As explained above, few issues dominate current political discourse as much as the 
question of how the United States should deal with the inflammatory policies perpetuated by the 
current Iranian regime. Perhaps no element of this modern political debate divides policymakers 
more than the questions of if and how the United States should use force against the Islamic 
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Republic. This paper will not make an argument regarding whether force should be utilized, but 
before answering the question of whether or not American force would be legally justified, it is 
important (for the practical purposes of this paper) to establish the context of the issue within 
American domestic politics.  
 Debate over weather or not the United States should use force against Iran can be broken 
down into two essential camps, like most other political issues, along party lines. While both 
Democrats and Republicans publicly agree that military force should be used only as a last 
resort, the two sides disagree on whether that point has been reached.  It is important to note that 
while all of the Iranian policies explored in Parts 1 and 3 contribute to the discussion of whether 
or not the United States should use force against Iran (e.g. the state’s human rights violations, 
support of international terrorism, and potential trade hostility), current political discourse within 
the United States centers primarily around Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. For this reason, 
my discussion below utilizes Iran’s nuclear program as the primary frame for exploring 
American domestic political debate.  
 On one side of the debate, the Obama Administration and most congressional Democrats 
see military action as “on the table, but not preferred,” believing we have not yet exhausted our 
non-military options in confronting the Iranian threat and force is not yet justified (Katzman, 
2011, p.57 and ProCon.org, 2007). While the Obama administration has not ruled out military 
options against Iran, it has repeatedly stressed the potential adverse consequences of force. 
Admiral Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaffirmed the concerns of 
the President, stressing the dangers to American forces and potential retaliation that would be 
caused by a preemptive strike (Katzman, 2011, p.58). Other members of the administration have 
stressed that force against Iran will not prevent Iran from pursuing a WMD, and may in fact 
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bolster the current regime’s legitimacy. According to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
“a military attack will only buy us time and send the [Iranian nuclear program] deeper and more 
covert” (AFPP, 2009). Additionally, opponents of force claim that bombing Iranian nuclear sites 
has the potential to cause mass civilian casualties, which will only reentrench the regime’s ability 
to foster the “rally-around-the-flag” effect presented in Part 1 (AFPP, 2009). Beyond concerns of 
the consequences of a strike against Iran, Democrats also believe that current American policies, 
like sanctions, have not been given enough time to run their course. They argue that sanctions 
against Iran, which will be discussed in detail in Part 5, have been updated as recently as 
November 2011 and need more time to achieve their desired goals (Landler & Sanger, 2012 and 
U.S. Department of State, 2011). Finally, many Democrats stress that the use of force against 
Iran now would constitute a lawless act of aggression under international law that would further 
isolate the United Sates and its allies rather than Iran (Landler & Sanger, 2012).   
 On the other side of the debate, most Republicans believe that the window in which Iran’s 
nuclear program can be stopped is rapidly closing, and the U.S. must therefore utilize a 
preemptive strike against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infrastructure. Proponents of the use of 
force stress the high probability that a mission now would cripple Iran’s nuclear program or at 
least set it back significantly. They argue that there are a limited number of key targets, and these 
targets are known and vulnerable (even those that are hardened or buried) to U.S. planners, so a 
strike would likely be comprehensive and successful (Katzman, 2011, p.58). In this view, time is 
of the essence, since it is highly likely that Iran will choose to move its most important nuclear 
operations to more secure locations and nuclear sites will become less feasible targets (Kroenig, 
2011, p.79). According to the IAEA, for example, a new fortified enrichment site with the 
capability to produce weapons grade uranium deep inside the mountain at Fordo (southwest of 
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Tehran) will be ready in the near future (Reuters, 2012). Advocates of the “force now” option 
also claim that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would devastate American foreign policy 
objectives in the Middle East, threatening political and military polices goals in the region 
(Kroenig, 2011, p.78). Among the loudest voices calling for military action against Iran now are 
high-ranking congressional Republicans and former members of the Bush administration. In a 
July 2011 House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing entitled “Iran and Syria: Next Steps,” 
Chairwomen Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) articulated a belief prevalent amongst her GOP 
colleagues; that the Obama administration is “not doing enough to prevent Iran from getting a 
[nuclear] bomb” (HCFA, 2011). In the same hearing, Former Ambassador to the UN under 
President Bush, John Bolton stressed that Iran’s nuclear weapons program is the single greatest 
national security crisis currently faced by the United States. In the ambassador’s opinion, 
sanctions against Iran have not worked and without the use of force by the U.S. in the immediate 
future the Islamic Republic will undoubtedly acquire a nuclear weapon. This, he claimed, would 
subsequently spark nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East, as states like Saudi Arabia 
feel threatened under an Iranian nuclear umbrella. For this reason the Ambassador argued that 
the Obama Administration is currently faced with two options. In Ambassador Bolton’s words: 
either “Iran gets the bomb or the U.S. acts with a preemptive military strike against Iranian 
nuclear capabilities” (HCFA, 2011). The potential Republican candidates for President have 
taken an equally hard-line stance. Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum, and Newt Gingrich have all 
stated publicly that they would go to war with Iran to prevent the state from acquiring a WMD 
(Montopoli, 2011 and Bradley, 2012).  Overall, proponents of American use of force against Iran 
now argue that a preemptive strike is the least bad option that would spare the region and the 
world of a dangerous threat, while improving the national security of the United States (Kroenig, 
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2011, p.77) 
 Public opinion regarding the use of force, like any issue in American national politics is 
split, but polling indicates that most of the American public sees force as a foreign policy of last 
resort that is not yet necessary. A CNN/ORC International poll released February 15th, 2012 
indicated that only 17% of the public thinks that the U.S. should use force against Iran at this 
time, with 60% responding that diplomatic or economic action against Islamic Republic was the 
right response, and 22% saying no action should be taken at this time (CNN/ORC, 2012). A 
Rasmussen poll conducted in November 2011 placed the percentage of Americans in support of 
military force as high as 38%, although respondents also stressed that the option should be 
utilized only if diplomacy fails (Bolduc, 2011). While public opinion is dynamic and it is 
ultimately unclear what the foreign policy direction the United States will choose to take, it is 
apparent that there are few, if any, international issue that are more dominant or divisive in 
American political discourse today.  
4.3—International Law and the Use of Force 
 The legality of the potential uses of force by the United States against the Islamic 
Republic can be evaluated the same way Iran’s breaches of international law were observed in 
Part 3. In Appendix F, I identify each of the primary sources of international law relating to the 
use of force and explore the most important provisions in detail. As stated above, the term “use 
of force” has come to denote “the broadest category relating to war,” encompassing attacks that 
range from military to cyber in nature (O’Connell, 2009, p.14). The most pervasive and 
important piece of international law relating to the use of force comes from Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter, which explicitly states; “All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
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of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN, 
1945). Although Art. 2(4) seemingly prohibits the use of force in any circumstance, in modern 
international law there are three ways in which use force against another state can become legal: 
(1) self defense, (2) countermeasures, and (3) authorization by the United Nations Security 
Council. For this reason, I have subdivided this section, and the corresponding appendix, into 
three subsections that each deal with one of the principles for force legalization.  
4.31—Self-Defense  
 The first way a state may legally become authorized to utilize force against another is 
through self-defense. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter modifies Art. 2(4), carving out 
this first exception to the prohibition of force in cases of individual and collective self-defense. 
Art. 51 states; “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” 
(UN, 1945). Art. 51 represents the principle’s current manifestation, but the concept of self-
defense dates back to at least the 17th Century and philosopher Hugo Grotius (SEP, 2005). A 
more modern interpretation was defined in the Caroline Affair of 1837. In a letter to Henry Fox, 
the British minister in Washington, Daniel Webster, the United States Secretary of State, argued 
that “the use of self-defense should be confined to situations in which a government can show 
the ‘necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation’” (Kearley, 1999, p.325). The exchange left a profound impact on 
the development of international law and subsequently outlined the Caroline Doctrine, which 
served as a test of whether preemptive/anticipatory self-defense was justified in a given situation. 
Under this doctrine, the use of force in self-defense must meet two criteria. First the action must 
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be necessary because the threat is imminent and thus peaceful alternatives are not an option 
(Kearley, 1999, p.325). Second, the action must be proportional, i.e. the response must be equal 
in scope to the threat (Tait, 2005, p.111). The principles outlined in the Caroline Doctrine remain 
as pillars of the doctrine of self-defense that today forms basis of customary international law 
dealing with the use of force.  
 In addition to the aspects that define self-defense, new elements of international law 
introduced in the aftermath of September 11th, have altered the use of force in the context of 
international terrorism. On September 12th, 2001 the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 1386, which called for terrorists to be brought to justice stating; “organizers and 
sponsors of those terrorist attacks and stressed that those responsible for aiding, supporting or 
harboring them would be held accountable” (UNSC, 2001). In addition, the discussion 
surrounding Res. 1386 tied terrorism to human rights. The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Mary Robinson said attacks like those committed on 9/11 "strike at the fundamental 
human rights of every person and are totally unacceptable" (UN News Centre, 2001). Weeks 
later the Security Council also passed Resolution 1373, which called on “States to work together 
urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts” (UNSC, 2001). While they are vague in their 
discussion of what responses become legal to states in the event of, or an attempt to prevent a 
terrorist attack, both resolutions illustrate the legality of member states to hold the perpetrators of 
terrorist attacks accountable for their actions in individual and collective self defense.  For a 
comprehensive list of the international law explored in this section see Appendix F Subsection 1. 
 Overall, the international legal standard of self-defense is well established and effective 
at legally prohibiting the use of force in many cases. For this reason, states often turn to a much 
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more contemporary area of international law, countermeasures, in an effort to legally justify 
force against other states.  
4.32—Countermeasures  
 The second way in which a state may legally become authorized to utilize force against 
another state is through countermeasures. Countermeasures are defined as “non-violent acts, 
which are illegal in themselves, but become legal when executed by one state in response to an 
earlier illegal act by another state towards the former” (Schachter, 1994, p.471). Ranging in 
scope from the suspension of treaty obligations to the use of force, countermeasures would be in 
breach of international obligations if they were not taken in response to an internationally 
wrongful act (ILC, 2001, p.128). In essence, countermeasures cover the area of international law 
between reprisals (forcible action, taken by way of self-help in response to a breach, i.e. actions 
in self-defense) and retorsion (“unfriendly” conduct that is consistent with the international 
obligation of the State engaging in it, i.e. cession of diplomatic relations). Although they are non-
violent in nature, countermeasures may still involve the use of force, which as explained above, 
includes political/economic coercion (covered in the following section), physical force not 
involving arms, and computer attacks. In other words “countermeasures covers that part of the 
subject of reprisals not associated with armed conflict,” and that part of the subject of retorsion 
once those acts breech international obligations (ILC, 2001, p.128). It is also important to note 
that countermeasures are “temporary measures, taken to achieve a specified end, whose 
justification terminates once the end is achieved” (ILC, 2001, p.129).  
 The legality of countermeasures is articulated in the International Law Commission (ILC) 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Article 22 of the Draft Articles states; “The wrongfulness 
of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is 
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precluded to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in 
accordance with chapter II of Part Three” (ILC, 2001, p.129). This legal principle was reiterated 
by the International Court of Justice in the 1997 case between Hungry and Slovakia concerning 
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project. In its decision the court stated: “In order to be justifiable, a 
countermeasure must meet certain conditions…In the first place it must be taken in response to a 
previous international wrongful act of another State and must be directed against that State” 
(Janis & Noyes, 2011, p.80). In Articles 49-53 of the Draft Articles the ILC expanded on Article 
22, outlining five primary criteria that must be satisfied for countermeasures to be considered 
legal under international law: (1) The act constituting countermeasure must be taken in response 
to a previous intentional wrongful act (i.e. the breech of international obligation) of another state 
and must be directed against that state (Art. 49); (2) The injured state must have already called 
upon the state committing the wrongful act to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make 
reparation, but the request was refused (Art. 52(1)(a)); (3) The countermeasure must be 
commensurate (i.e. proportional) with the injury suffered, taking into account the rights in 
question (Art. 51); (4) The purpose behind evoking the countermeasure is to induce the 
wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations under international law, and therefore the 
measure must be reversible (Art. 49(2)); (5) Countermeasures must be terminated once the 
responsible state has complied with its obligations in relation to the wrongful act (Art. 53) (ILC, 
2001, p.129). Although, under Article 54 of the Draft Articles only the injured state may lawfully 
take measures against the responsible state, the commentary for Article 42 extends the term 
“injured” to include States entitled to evoke responsibility for a wrongful act based on a breach 
of an obligation to the international community as a whole (ILC, 2001, p. 138). Commentary for 
Article 48 subsequently stipulates that measures may be taken by third party states for the 
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protection of the collective interest of the group. For a comprehensive list of the international law 
explored in this section, see Appendix F Subsection 2. 
 While countermeasures also have a narrow range of applicability, they do constitute a 
second set of principles that can potentially justify the use of force. As will be explored in the 
next sections, it is countermeasures that provide the United States with a legal basis for some 
actions used to respond to Iranian hostility.  
4.33—United Nations Security Council Authorization 
 The final way in which a state may legally use force against another under international 
law is through authorization by the United Nations Security Council. According to Article 39 of 
the United Nations Charter; “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN, 
1945). Although they may call for the compliance of the parties involved (Article 40) and/or 
utilize non-force measures (Article 41), ultimately the Security Council can authorize the use of 
force. According to Article 42; “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for 
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security…Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of Members of the United Nations” (UN, 1945). In 2004, the criteria for UNSC force 
authorization were explained in detail in the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats 
Challenges and Change (U.N. Doc. A/59/565: 2004). According to the report, the Security 
Council uses five criteria in determining whether or not to authorize force; (1) seriousness of 
threat, (2) proper purpose, (3) last resort, (4) proportional means, and (5) balance of 
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consequences. As stated above, the final two principles follow directly from the Caroline 
Doctrine. For a comprehensive list of the international law explored in this section, see Appendix 
F Subsection 3.  
 Like the other two principles that provide a legal justification for the use of force, United 
Nations Security Council authorization, is extremely difficult to attain. Since the UNSC is 
composed of a group of states with different interests and objectives, it is challenging for any 
state to make the case for potential force scenarios. Although the United Nations has followed 
the lead of the United States and introduced sanctions against the Islamic Republic, the 
authorization of the use of force remains a pipedream for hawkish American politicians.  
4.4—American Force Capability  
 As the undisputed global hegemon with military and intelligence capabilities that far 
surpass any other country in the world, there are many potential force options the United States 
has at its disposal to respond to Iran’s inflammatory policies and breaches of international law. In 
this section I outline the most probable American force scenarios in the context of the three areas 
of Iranian international law violations examined in Part 3 of this paper; (1) Iran’s nuclear 
program, (2) human rights violations, and (3) support for international terrorism. Since Iran has 
only threatened blocking the Strait of Hormuz, but has not yet violated international law, hostile 
trade policy is not examined in detail. Subsequently I examine how each option conforms to the 
America obligations under international law explored above.  
4.5—Force Against the Iranian Nuclear Program 
 In terms of the Iranian nuclear program, there are currently three likely ways in which the 
United States could utilize force to thwart the Islamic Republic’s attempt to acquire a WMD; (1) 
American military strikes, (2) proxy strikes, and (3) computer attacks. While the first two of 
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these options would probably involve the same type of military action, strikes on key Iranian 
nuclear sites, the state actor carrying out the operation is variable.  
4.51a—Force Scenario One: American Air Strikes  
 In the first scenario, the United States military would be solely responsible for destroying 
Iranian nuclear facilities through air strikes. Although there are nearly twenty-five nuclear 
facilities in Iran, a potentially crippling strike against Iran’s nuclear program would need only to 
target the most strategically important sites. In this regard, the United States would minimize the 
cost, time, and collateral damage of the attack. Potential attack sites include the following (some 
of which were explained in detail in Part 1 of this paper): (1) Isfahan Nuclear Technology 
Center—headquarters of Iran's uranium-conversion efforts into hexafluoride gas (used in 
centrifuges), uranium oxide (used to fuel reactors), and metal (used in the core of nuclear 
bombs); (2) Gachin Uranium Mine—production of uranium ore concentrate, i.e. yellowcake, for 
enrichment; (3) Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant—home to 3000 centrifuges responsible for 
enrichment of uranium at high levels; (4) Parchin Weapons Testing Center—munitions center 
and possible nuclear weapons testing site; (5) Bushehr Nuclear Power Station—houses a 1000-
magawatt reactor, the spent fuel from which, according to the Nonproliferation Policy Education 
Center, would be capable of producing 50-75 bombs;  (6) Arak Heavy Water Plant—production 
of heavy water used to moderate nuclear fission chain reactions and produce weapons grade 
plutonium; (7) Qom Uranium Enrichment Plant—production of Highly Enriched Uranium 
(concentration of 20% or more) needed to build nuclear weapons (BBC, 2012 and Pike, 2012). 
Although it is highly speculative how exactly the United States would carry out air strikes 
against these sites, a potential attack would probably resemble the beginning of the 2003 air 
campaign against Iraq, utilizing B-2 stealth bombers and/or F-117 stealth fighters. In addition to 
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attack forces, which would most likely be minimal, the United States would also mobilize both 
conventional and unconventional forces to be used in the event of a counterattack (Pike, 2012). 
4.51b—Force Scenario One—Legal Assessment 
 In terms of legality, although Iran has blatantly ignored many of its obligations under the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement (see Part 3 and Appendix 
A), the type of attack explained above would be in breach of current U.S. obligations under 
international law. A preemptive strike at this time would not constitute self-defense, since in this 
scenario there would have been no prior attack by the Islamic Republic and because it would not 
pass the Caroline Doctrine’s principle of “necessity” required to justify an anticipatory use of 
force (Kearley, 1999, p.325). The newest rounds of sanctions imposed by the Obama 
Administration in November 2011, have clearly not been given ample time to achieve their 
goals, illustrating the fact that the U.S. has not yet exhausted all peaceful alternatives to force. 
This type of preemptive force is also not justified by countermeasures, since strikes would 
constitute a violent act (Schachter, 1994, p.471). Finally, while the United Nations Security 
Council has called on Iran to comply with its obligations under the NPT and even imposed its 
own set of sanctions targeting the Iranian nuclear program, at this time the UNSC has not 
authorized the use of force. For these reasons, American use of force against Iran is currently in 
breach of international law.  
4.52a—Force Scenario Two—Proxy Air Strikes  
 A secondary option in which the United State could potentially facilitate the use of force 
against Iran is through an indirect proxy attack. Similar in scope and range of targets to the 
potential American air strike explained above, a proxy strike would utilize the Israeli military as 
the primary actor, albeit with substantial support from American intelligence and hardware. 
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Many experts, including former CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, believe an 
Israeli attack is currently the most likely military scenario since “Israeli officials view a nuclear-
armed Iran as an existential threat and have repeatedly refused to rule out the possibility that 
Israel might strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure”(Katzman, 2011, p.58). In many ways the current 
Israeli administration has taken militaristic stance against the Iranian nuclear program similar to 
the attitude of Republicans in the United States. In April 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu expressed his hard-stance stating; “You don’t want a messianic apocalyptic cult 
controlling atomic bombs” (Katzman, 2011, p.63). Israel has also already illustrated its ability to 
carry out these types of strategic air strikes. In 1981, under the orders of Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin, Israel used F-15 interceptors and F-16 bombers to destroy a nuclear reactor at 
Osirak, 18 miles south of Baghdad (BBC, 1981). The United States already provides Israel with 
the defensive capabilities necessary to carry out strategic air strikes; for FY2012 the U.S. will 
provide Israel $3 billion in military aid, 75% of which Israel will use to purchase American 
defensive equipment (Sharp, 2009, p.4). Additionally, the strategic alliance between the two 
nations also includes substantial intelligence sharing that has been stepped up recently in 
response to the growing threat Iran’s nuclear program poses to the two nations (NYT, 2012). 
While the United States can not directly order Israel to take military action against Iranian 
nuclear infrustructure, prodding of Israel’s top defense officials could be very effective given 
Israel’s reliance on the United States political and military support. Divisions between the 
Obama White House and Netanyahu administration make this option less likely today, but this 
type of strategy would become much more likely with a Republican win in the November 
presidential election, realigning the sentiment of Washington and Jerusalem with regard to Iran. 
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4.52b—Force Scenario Two—Legal Assessment  
 It is not the intent of this paper to argue whether Israel is currently justified under 
international law to launch a preemptive strike (under anticipatory self-defense or any other legal 
principle that justifies the use of force), therefore the legality of this type of attack will be 
considered from a purely American perspective (Kearley, 1999, p.325).  The international legal 
responsibilities of the United States surrounding this type of strategy to thwart Iran’s attempt to 
produce a nuclear weapon are, however, somewhat ambiguous, since the U.S. would play only a 
secondary role. While military support and intelligence sharing are not illegal under international 
law, many “U.S. military leaders believe…that an Israeli strike would inevitably draw the United 
States into a conflict with Iran” (Katzman, 2011, p.59). In the event this scenario became reality, 
the United States would be faced with the same international legal obligations discussed in the 
previous section. In this regard, support for an Israeli attack is legal so long as U.S. forces do not 
become involved. Ultimately, while an Israeli preemptive strike does not violate international 
law, the use of force by the United States remains illegal under American obligations.  
4.53a—Force Scenario Three—Cyber Attacks 
 The third and final probable option for the United States to use force against  
Iran is through computer attacks. Unlike the previous two options discussed in this paper, 
computer attacks have already been used against Iranian nuclear facilities. In late 2010, Iranian 
officials discovered that computer hacking operation targeting the nation’s uranium enrichment 
infrastructure.  The worm, named “Stuxnet,” spread through Microsoft Windows targeting 
Siemens software and equipment (which Iran procured on the black market to avoid sanctions) 
controlling the centrifuges at a number of Iranian nuclear cites. Unlike previous worms, which 
were built only to spy, Stuxnet was revolutionary in its ability to reprogram industrial systems 
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(McMillan, 2010). In September-October 2010 the tactical computer virus “target[ed] Iranian 
nuclear facility computers by altering the spin rate [of centrifuges], causing Iran to take about 
1,000 centrifuges out of service” (Katzman, 2011, p.32). The worm temporarily disrupted 
Tehran’s enrichment efforts, but a report by the IAEA in May 2011 revealed, “the targeted plants 
have fully recovered” (Kroenig, 2011, p.77). Although no country has officially taken 
responsibility for the Stuxnet attack, it is speculated that the United States and/or Israel deployed 
the virus. In May 2011, Gary Samore, White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons 
of Mass Destruction indirectly outlined the position of the United States to the Stuxnet attack 
stating; "we're glad they [the Iranians] are having trouble with their centrifuge machine and that 
we—the U.S. and its allies—are doing everything we can to make sure that we complicate 
matters for them" (Chapman & Rosenfeld, 2011). The official Israeli position is equally vague, 
but top Israeli Officials have hinted that Israel is actively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities. In 
2010, military intelligence chief, Major-General Amos Yadlin disclosed a new intelligence unit 
set up to incorporate high-tech hacking tactics, which could have been used to deploy the Stuxnet 
virus (Williams, 2010).  
4.53b—Force Scenario Three—Legal Assessment  
 As explained above, in Nicaragua v. United States the ICJ expanded the traditional 
definition of force to include more modern mechanisms of attacking other states, such as 
computer attacks. For this reason, cyber-warfare must meet the same criteria as armed attacks to 
be considered legal under international law. Like the law applied to air strikes in the previous 
section, preemptive computer strikes are also not justified through the legal principle of self 
defense since, at this time, there has been no prior use of force (military or otherwise) by the 
Islamic Republic against the United States. Similarly, since the United Nations Security Council 
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has not yet authorized force (military, cyber, or otherwise) against Iran. Because computer 
attacks are non-violent, however, they firmly fit under the definition of a countermeasure and 
upon a closer examination are legal under American international obligations. According to 
Article 3 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, “there is an internationally wrongful act of 
a State when: (a) conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under 
international law; and  (b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State” (ILC, 2001, p. 36). As explained in Part 3 and Appendix A of this paper it is abundantly 
clear that Iran is in violation of its international obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
the state’s Safeguards Agreement. These Iranian violations, while not directed at any one state 
specifically can be considered to be directed at any other state that is also a signatory to the NPT, 
since the security of those state’s who remain in compliance with their obligations is threatened 
when another signatory (in this case Iran), is in breech (see Art. 54 and Art. 33 of the ILC Draft 
Articles—Appendix F Subsection 2) (ILC, 2001, p. 138). In this regard, cyber-attacks against 
Iranian nuclear infrastructure meet the first criteria for a legal countermeasure stipulated by Art. 
49 of the Draft Articles. As explained above, for countermeasure to be considered legal under 
international law, they must meet four additional criteria. First, in accordance with Art. 52(1)(a) 
the United States, along with the other nations that comprise the Security Council, have called on 
Iran numerous times to halt its pursuit of nuclear weapons since the initial imposition of UNSC 
sanctions in 2006. Second, in compliance with Art. 51, cyber-attacks against Iran have (or will) 
only targeted nuclear infrastructure that aids in the state’s breaches of the NPT and are therefore 
commensurate (i.e. proportional) with the injury suffered by the U.S. Finally, fulfilling Art. 49(2) 
and Art. 53, computer viruses have (or would) only be used to induce Iranian compliance with 
the NPT, i.e. halting any current violation of state obligations under the treaty, and can be 
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programmed to desist once the goal is achieved (ILC, 2001, p.129). For example, cyber-attacks 
that target centrifuges could be programmed to cease once the machines are spinning exclusively 
at speeds that will produce safe enrichment levels. Overall, it is clear that while any other 
potential use of force by the United States against the Iranian nuclear program today would be 
considered counter to American international obligations, cyber-attacks constitute a legal 
countermeasure and are therefore justified under international law.  
4.7—Force Against Iranian Human Rights Violations  
 The second area of inflammatory policy that the United States could potential respond to 
with the use of force, Iranian human rights violations, is also the area that would be the most 
difficult to justify an intervention under international law. The United States has publicly 
condemned human rights violations in Iran dating back to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
According to the State Department, however, the state’s most egregious violations have occurred 
more recently, under President Ahmadinejad (State Department, 2012). While the United States 
has yet to use force to prevent additional violations, American diplomatic discourse has been 
increasingly supportive of resistance movements over time.  
4.71a—Human Rights Force Scenario 
 The use of force in this area would most likely take the form of support to Iranian 
resistance groups, the so-called Green Movement, in the hope of pushing Iranian citizens to 
pursue large-scale government reforms. The Iranian Green Movement, which traces its roots to 
the presidential campaign of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the opposition candidate to President 
Ahmadinejad, picked up steam in political protests against perceived fraud in the Presidential 
election of 2009 (Mebane, 2009). Comprised of a number of smaller official and unofficial 
organizations within the Iranian civil society, including the Confederation of Iranian Students, 
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the Islamic Iran Participation Front, the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization, labor 
unions and other prominent dissidents, the Green Movement came to stand for democratic 
reforms to the current government  (Katzman, 2011, p.11). Today, however, the movement’s 
message has become more extreme, calling for a new revolution and overthrow of the Islamic 
Republic. Reformers have also become fragmented by a lack of clear leadership and increased 
efforts by the government to suppress their activities (perhaps in an effort to prevent the Arab 
Spring from reaching Tehran) (Katzman, 2011, p.13-14). 
 The U.S. government connection to the Green Movement to date has been only vocal in 
nature. While the Obama Administration has been publicly supportive of the movement’s efforts, 
the President has come under fire for missing a potentially monumental opportunity in the 
summer of 2009 (Katzman, 2011, p.1 and Ward, 2011). Following the fraudulent reelection of 
Ahmadinejad the Obama administration was heavily criticized for not providing the Green 
Movement with the necessary military, logistical, and humanitarian support to achieve its 
objectives and overthrow the current regime. Instead, violent crackdowns on the street protests in 
Tehran and other major cities produced more human rights violations (see Appendix B). A use of 
force today, would most likely take the form of supporting dissidence in an effort to reform the 
current Iranian regime and subsequently prevent future violations. At this time there is no 
indication that the Obama Administration has plans to provide the Movement with direct 
material support, but this type of intervention would become much more likely if Iranian 
domestic protests ramped up again in the future (Katzman, 2011, p.2).  
4.71b—Human Rights Force Scenario—Legal Assessment  
 Although material and/or logistical support to a dissident population that has been subject 
to countless human rights violations may not seem, on face, to be a use of force, because 
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American efforts would most certainly carry a Western agenda, they would be classified as 
political coercion under the definition laid out in the Nicaragua Case (O’Connell, 2009, p.14). 
For this reason the prohibition on the use of force articulated in Article 2(4) of the U.N. charter, 
which explicitly states, “all Members shall refrain…from the use of force against the…political 
independence of any state,” is equally applicable. Unlike the other two areas of inflammatory 
Iranian policy examined in this section, however, Iran’s human rights violations are domestic in 
nature, i.e. they do not directly impact the United States. In this regard, it is much more difficult 
for the U.S. to justify a use of force. Human rights violations do not constitute an attack against 
the United States nor do they threaten American security, eliminating a justification of the use of 
force through self-defense. Additionally, while the violations do constitute an internationally 
wrongful act of a state (see Appendix F Subsection 1), the act is not directed at the United States 
and therefore does not justify the use of countermeasures in response (ILC, 2001, p.36). For this 
reason, the only legal justification for the use of force against Iranian human rights violations can 
come from authorization by the United Nations Security Council. The UNSC has not given 
permission for member states to intervene in this area to date and it is therefore not legal for the 
U.S. to use force now. The Council has, however, authorized similar uses of force to prevent 
human rights atrocities in the past. Most recently the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, 
authorizing “all necessary measures to protect civilians” (i.e. the use of force), in Libya (UNSC, 
2011). While current conditions in Iran will most likely not spur the Security Council to take 
similar action, if circumstances became dire as they did in the summer of 2009, the authorization 
of force would be more likely. Overall, although an American intervention may significantly 
benefit the current condition of the Iranian people, the use of force with regard to Iranian human 
rights violations is currently not justified under international law.   
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6.6—Force Against Iranian Support of International Terrorism  
 The final area of provocative Iranian policy that could prompt the U.S. to use of force is 
the state’s support of international terrorism. Like Iran’s nuclear program, the Islamic Republic’s 
support of international terrorism only indirectly impacted the United States from the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 until 2011. During this time, while Iranian support of Hizballah and Hamas 
targeted the United State’s most important ally in the Middle East, Israel, Iran did not engage in 
explicit efforts to harm Americans. The plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. uncovered 
last October, however, forced the United States to reconsider the likelihood of a state-sponsored 
terrorist attack on American soil (Cooper, 2011, p.1).  
6.61a—Terrorism Force Scenario  
 Although the Obama administration has been unclear in exactly how the United States 
would go about utilizing force to respond to Iranian state sponsored terrorism by Iran in the 
future, American action would most likely employ targeted strikes against key government 
officials with ties to terrorism and/or supply lines funneling military aid to terrorist groups 
(Amidror, 2007, p.3-4). Unlike the scope of a preemptive strike against the Iranian nuclear 
program, the force responses to Iranian support of international terrorism very greatly based on 
the specific geopolitical circumstances at the time of an attack. In this regard, rather than 
explaining how a specific force scenario (i.e. assassination plots of key Iranian government 
officials) conforms to international law, in this area I take the opposite approach and outline the 
key elements of American international obligations that must be considered in the event of a 
Iranian-sponsored terrorist attack.  
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6.61b—Terrorism Force Scenario—Legal Assessment 
 Prior to turning to the traditional elements of international law governing the use of force 
it is first important to consider the case of state-sponsored Iranian terrorist attacks in light of 
updates to international law that emerged following September 11th, and answer the question; do 
new sources of international law change the way states may respond to a terrorist attack or a 
perceived threat? As explained above, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the United Nations 
Security Council adopted Resolutions 1368 and 1373 reaffirming the commitment of the 
international community to prevent future terrorist activities. While both resolutions strongly 
condemn those who support international terrorist activities, neither explicitly specifies what 
retributive actions become legal in the wake of terrorist attacks on member states nor steps states 
may take to prevent an attack. The vagueness of these resolutions do, however, illustrate the fact 
that although the United States has already been a target of state-sponsored terrorism by Iran, 
American action must conform to same legal principles that justify any other use of force. For 
this reason, a discussion of the legality of potential force by the United States can be broken 
down into two essential questions: (1) may the United States use force now with regard to Iran’s 
support of international terrorism? And (2) how may the United States use force in response to a 
future Iranian-sponsored terrorist strike? To answer both of these questions we must turn our 
attention to the same sources of international law governing the use of force.  
 In terms of self-defense, the United States is not legally justified in using of force against 
Iran for its support for international terrorism at this time. Although the United States has already 
been the target of Iranian state terrorism, since the plot to kill the Saudi ambassador was 
thwarted the action does not justify a force response at this time (Kearley, 1999, p.325). Even 
when considered as a justification for anticipatory self-defense (i.e. as proof that Iran is engaged 
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with terrorist organizations in plots against the U.S.), preemptive force does not does not pass the 
Caroline Doctrine’s test of necessity since the United States has proven its ability to mitigate 
terrorist threats through peaceful means (Kearley, 1999, p.325). In other words, the ability of the 
United States to successfully prevent the terrorist action proves that the use of force is not 
justified at this time. Additionally, while the United States, Israel, and many other Western 
nations have classified Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist organizations, conflict confined to the 
Middle East (i.e. violent disputes with the state of Israel) are territorial in nature and do not 
involve third parties, making a strike against Iran extremely difficult to justify under Art. 51 of 
the UN Charter. The United States may be able to effectively argue that attacks by the two 
organizations against Israel constitute terrorism and subsequently justify a legal use of force 
against Hezbollah and/or Hamas. Force action against Iran directly, however, would certainly do 
more harm than good in maintaining international peace and security and is therefore contrary to 
the provision of collective self-defense (UN, 1945). Similarly, since no wrongful act against the 
United States has actually occurred, countermeasures do not justify the use of force against the 
Islamic Republic at this time. Finally, while the United Nations General Assembly did adopt a 
Saudi-sponsored resolution condemning the plot to kill the state’s ambassador to the U.S. by a 
vote of 106-9-40, the UNSC did not take action in authorizing retaliatory force (RASE, 2011).  
 While the United States may not be authorized under international law to respond with 
force to the thwarted plot against the Saudi ambassador last October, a successful attack by Iran 
in the future would provide the U.S. with ample legal ground for retaliation. In terms of self-
defense, a terrorist attack would clearly constitute an armed attack and, so long as the United 
States has sufficient proof implicating the Iranian regime in the incident, the U.S. would be 
justified in using force. Similarly, in the event that American intelligence showed an 
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immediately credible threat that could not be prevented using peaceful means, the U.S. would 
also be justified in launching a proportional anticipatory strike against the Islamic Republic (Tait, 
2005, p.111). Additionally, in terms of countermeasures, the U.S. would be justified in utilizing 
non-violent commensurate reprisals, in order to pressure Iran to comply with its international 
obligation to refrain from the use of terrorism. While it is impossible to determine whether or not 
the UNSC would authorize action against the Islamic Republic (depending on the specific attack 
and the other geopolitical forces at the time), the United States could be justified in using force 
against Iran in the event of a future state-sponsored terrorist attack.  
6.8—Concluding Remarks and the Future Application of the Use of Force 
 It is not the intent of this paper to make an argument dealing with whether or not the use 
of force would be successful in achieving American foreign policy objectives, but as explained 
in Part 2, it is still necessary to examine how international law aligns with potential action 
toward the provocative policies of the Islamic republic now and in the future (see Part 2). While 
cyber attacks on nuclear facilities are currently the only American use of force that would be 
legal under international law (proxy attacks do not constitute an American action), the scope of 
potential future action is extremely wide. Since the legality of the use of force against Iran is 
totally dependent on the future policies of the Islamic Republic, it is conceivable that any of the 
force scenario examined in this paper could become legal under international law. Additionally, 
it is important to note that force against hostile Iranian trade policy, which is not examined in this 
section, since Iran has not yet blocked international commerce from passing through the Strait of 
Hormuz, could also become legal. In this regard the trajectory of legal American policy follows 
directly on changes in Iranian policy, especially in the event that Iranian policies directly impact 
the United States (e.g. a successful terrorist attack on American soil or against American 
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citizens). Overall, while only one element of the use of force is currently justified under 
international law, if other policy options (see below) are ultimately unsuccessful, the use of force 
may become a likely alternative. 
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Part 5: American Sanctions 
5.1—Overview of Sanctions  
 Unlike potential American uses of force against the Islamic Republic examined in Part 4 
of this paper, sanctions are already being utilized by the United States to counter some of Iran’s 
inflammatory policies and breaches of international law. Although they are not explicitly defined 
in the United Nation’s Charter, sanctions are a foreign policy tool that most often includes the 
interruption of economic relations, communications and/or the severance of diplomatic relations 
(Kondoch, 2001, p.269). Following the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979, the United States 
suspended all formal diplomatic ties with Iran and today the states have no diplomatic relations 
(BBC, 2011). Because comprehensive sanctions in this realm already exist (and are justified 
independent of legal analysis), this section focuses instead on the legality of sanctions that 
permeate the dynamic economic relationship between the two states. I explore current sanction 
policy towards Iran discussing why sanctions were implemented, their current place within the 
domestic politics of the United States and finally their legality as a foreign policy tool moving 
forward. Since sanctions are already being utilized I observe their legality on a holistic level, 
rather than separating the discussion into the specific applications in response to the 
inflammatory Iranian policies presented in Part 1 of this paper.  
5.2—Context Within American Domestic Politics  
 The modern manifestations of sanctions against Iran are noteworthy, first and foremost, 
for the bipartisan support they enjoy as a foreign policy tool. Sanctions against the Islamic 
Republic have held broad congressional support since they were introduced and have crosscut 
three republican (Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush) and two democratic 
(Bill Clinton and Barack Obama) presidential administrations. The most recent update to 
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sanctions against Iran, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 
(CISADA), for example, passed 408-8 in the House of Representatives, 98-0-2 in the Senate 
(Iran Watch, 2011). Although there remains a vigorous debate regarding the effectiveness of 
unilateral American sanctions, there is broad agreement that the U.S. should utilize sanctions to 
prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon, committing human rights violations, and 
supporting international terrorism (Clawson, 2011). Additionally there is bipartisan agreement 
that “to target the regime rather than the Iranian people, to encourage Iran to engage and 
compromise, and to urge other governments to join a coordinated approach towards Iran” i.e. 
ensure that sanctions conform to American international obligations and are multilateral 
whenever possible (see Sec. 114 of CISADA below). While they have drawn external criticism 
for their effectiveness and ethicality since they were introduced, sanctions have intensified 
through five presidential administrations “indicating a broad bipartisan consensus that, for all 
their faults, sanctions are an important part of the U.S. policy mix towards Iran” (Clawson, 
2011). 
5.3—The Imposition of Sanctions  
 The United States has utilized sanctions against Iran since 1987 for the same four primary 
policy areas enumerated in Part 1 of this paper. According to the United States Department of the 
Treasury, one of the three principle agencies responsible for maintaining international sanctions, 
Iran’s support for international terrorism and its aggressive actions against non-belligerent 
shipping in the Persian Gulf were the initial driving force for implementing sanctions (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2011, p.1). While these two elements of motivation remain 
important, today the American rationale for sanctions against Iran has grown to include nuclear 
proliferation and human rights violations (Clawson, 2011). The United States has traditionally 
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not utilized Iran’s violations of its international obligations as a justification for sanctions policy 
(i.e. protecting American international interests have been the primary incentive), but at this 
current juncture American national interest and international law coincide.   
 In response to Iran’s support for terrorist organizations, its threatening trade policy, its 
nuclear program, and its human rights violations, the United States has imposed a series of harsh 
economic sanctions against the current regime. As explained below, these policies bar all 
banking transactions between the two states, any imports from Iran, any exports to Iran, any 
financial dealings with Iran, as well as many aid programs to Iranian citizens (Overview of 
Sanctions, 2009). Although they will not be explored in detail in this paper (since they are not 
directly an American foreign) the United States has also endorsed further sanctions implemented 
by the United Nations Security Council in response to Iran’s violations of the NPT. These 
sanctions, which are loose in comparison to the ones levied by the United States, contribute to 
the perceived legitimacy of American action against Iran by providing some multilateral backing 
(United Nations Security Council, 2008). 
5.4—History of Sanctions 
 Sanctions have been a preferred foreign policy tool by the United States since World War 
II, “standing between statements and soldiers,” i.e. providing a middle road between diplomacy 
and military action (Schott, 1998 and Chesterman & Pouligny, 2003, p.503). Today, the U.S. is 
engaged in over 30 cases of sanctions, more than at any other point in the country’s history. 
These sanctions differ in the states they target, international backing, and specific foreign policy 
objectives they seek to accomplish (e.g prevention military advances, arms proliferation, 
international terrorism, drug trafficking, and human rights abuses) (Schott, 1998). 
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 Sanctions have been utilized by the United Sates against Iran for over 20 years; the 
product of a number of policy actions by the executive branch of government (to a lesser extent 
the legislative branch has also contributed). Sanctions were originally created by Executive 
Order 12613 issued by President Ronald Reagan on October 29, 1987 (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2011, p.1). President Reagan’s original sanctions imposed a trade embargo against 
Iran-originated goods and services, but did not cut off all trade ties with the Islamic Republic. 
These sanctions still serve as the foundation for American sanctions towards Iran, but subsequent 
administrations have altered and expanded the policy. In 1995, President Bill Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12957, which prohibited U.S. involvement with petroleum development in Iran 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011, p.1). In 1997, the Clinton administration further 
expanded the scope of sanctions with Executive Orders 12959 and 13059 prohibiting “virtually 
all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2011, p.1). In 2010, President Obama altered the sanctions slightly by clarifying American 
policy regarding financial transfers to and from Iran, provisions on certain goods, and penalties 
for violating the Iranian Transaction Regulations. In an attempt to “increase pressure on Iran to 
comply with the full range of its international obligations” the Obama Administration again 
increased the scope of American sanctions imposed against the Islamic Republic in November 
2011. The administration introduced Executive Orders 13590 and 13382, and a new 
classification of Iran under the PATRIOT Act, in an effort to further restrict financial 
transactions that could potentially benefit Iranian nuclear program. Today, though, the most 
important elements of sanctions remain President Clinton’s additions (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2011, p.1 and U.S. Department of State, 2011).  
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5.5—Current Sanctions  
 Current sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran are facilitated through joint 
action of the U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. State Department, and Office of Terrorism Finance 
and Economic Sanctions Policy. The most important aspects of current sanctions, those 
originally imposed by the Clinton administration, can be broken down into five principle 
categories explained below: 
5.51—Primary Sanction Categories  
1) Imports from Iran (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011, p.1) 
• Goods and services of Iranian origin may not be imported into the 
United States either directly or through third party countries  
• U.S. citizens are prohibited from providing financing for prohibited 
import transactions   
2) Exports to Iran (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011, p.1-2) 
• Unless licensed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, goods, 
technology, or services may not be exported (directly or indirectly) from 
the United States (i.e. any person acting within the U.S.) to Iran or the 
Government of Iran  
• Exports are prohibited if the person acting knows or has reason to know 
that such items are intended for supply, transshipment, or re-exportation 
to Iran  
• Donations, gifts, and humanitarian effects (e.g. agricultural commodities, 
medicine, and medical devices, and “information and informational 
materials) valued at $100 or less are permitted 
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3) Dealing in Iranian-Originated Goods and Services (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2011, p.2) 
• U.S. citizens are prohibited from engaging in any transactions, including 
purchase, sale, transportation, swap, financing, or brokering related to 
goods or services of Iranian origin or goods or services owned or 
controlled by the Government of Iran 
• U.S. citizens are prohibited from engaging in any transaction or dealing 
in property or interests in property of Iranian banks 
4) Financial Dealings with Iran (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011, p.2) 
• New investments by U.S. citizens including commitments of funds or 
other assets, loans or any other extensions of credit, in Iran or in 
property (including entities) owned or controlled by the Government of 
Iran are prohibited 
5) Dealings with Iranian Petroleum Industry (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2011, p.3) 
• U.S. citizens may not trade in Iranian oil or petroleum products refined in 
Iran, nor may they finance such trading 
• U.S. persons may not perform services, including financing, or supply 
goods or technology that would benefit the Iranian oil industry 
5.52—Obama Administration Sanction Updates  
 In addition to a categorization of current sanctions imposed by the United Sates against 
Iran it is also worth noting the four major Obama administration updates to sanction policy. First, 
in June 2010, President Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
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Divestment Act (CISADA), which overwhelmingly passed both houses of Congress (408-8 in 
the House, 98-0 in the Senate) (Iran Watch, 2011). CISADA was the Obama administration’s 
first action aimed at broadly tightening American sanctions against Iran and revising numerous 
legal restrictions against the Islamic Republic made under previous presidential executive orders 
(Clawson, 2011). Second, in November 2011 President Obama signed Executive Order 13590, 
which updated existing regulations on dealings with the Iranian petroleum industry adding value 
restrictions on transactions. Third, in a revision to Executive Order 13382 also signed in 
November 2011, the Obama administration updated corporation-specific sanctions targeting 
companies that “support a variety of Iran’s proscribed nuclear procurement activities, including 
centrifuge development, heavy water research reactor activities, and uranium enrichment.”  
Additionally, E.O. 13382 introduced new sanctions targeting companies that deal with the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), “main Iranian organization for research and 
development activities in the field of nuclear technology, including Iran’s centrifuge enrichment 
program and experimental laser enrichment of uranium program.” Finally, the new set of 
sanctions included a classification of Iran as a “primary money laundering concern” of the 
United States, under Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act. This classification, for the first time, 
creates a clear pubic record of the scope and depth of Iran’s breaches of its international 
obligations, implicating the entire Iranian financial sector (i.e. Iran’s Central Bank, private 
Iranian banks, and branches, and subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran) as 
complicit in the state’s support of terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, attempt to 
facilitate WMD proliferation, and illicit and deceptive financial (U.S. Department of State, 
2011). For a comprehensive list of the updates to American sanctions under the Obama 
Administration, see Appendix G.  
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5.6—Goals and Targets of Sanctions 
 The broad economic sanctions explained above are predicated on American interest to 
prevent the perpetuation of the policies presented in Part 1 of this paper. Limitations on financial 
dealings with Iran and its oil industry, for example, are aimed at decreasing state revenue, which 
can subsequently be used to finance any of the Islamic Republic’s other inflammatory policies 
(e.g. its nuclear program or providing support to terrorist allies) (Clawson, 2011). The use of 
sanctions, therefore, specifically targets the Iranian government as well as those Iranian 
companies/individuals explicitly engaged in the provocative Iranian policies that have placed the 
two states on a crash course for conflict with one another.  
5.7—Legality Assessment of Current Sanctions 
 Similar to the evaluation of the potential use of force by the United States in the previous 
section, current American sanctions levied against the Islamic Republic should also be 
considered in terms of how they align with American international legal obligations. In 
Appendix H, I identify each of the primary sources of international law relating to sanctions as a 
foreign policy tool and explore the most important provisions in some detail. In this section I 
identify “coercive action” and “starvation of civilians” as the two primary determinants of the 
legality of modern international sanctions, concepts laid out in a number of international and 
domestic agreements that I enumerate in detail. I subsequently make the argument that since 
American sanctions do not violate either of these two principles, they are legal under 
international law and the domestic legal code of the United States. 
 The first provision of international law important in identifying the legality of American 
sanctions levied against Iran is a ban on “coercive action” used against another state. This 
principle was originally articulated in the Charter of Economic Rights & Duties of States 
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(CERDS), a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974. Article 
32 of CERDS stipulates that “no state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any 
other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind” (U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/29/3281, 1974). The principle of coercive action was expanded upon in United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 44/215 of 1989, which called specifically upon developed 
countries to refrain from utilizing economic instruments (e.g. trade and financial restrictions, 
blockades, embargoes, and other economic sanctions) for the purpose of inducing changes in the 
domestic policies of developing states (U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/215, 1989).  While current 
American sanctions may appear on face to violate one or both of these international agreements, 
it is important to consider key terminology as well as all aspects of these provisions in order to 
make a determination on the legality of sanctions as a whole. Most importantly, while sanctions 
do intend to change some of the current policies of the Islamic Republic, the sovereign rights of 
Iran do not include human rights violations and/or support of international terrorism—two of the 
primary reasons sanctions were levied in the first place. The same analysis applies to the goal of 
American sanctions to thwart Iran’s attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon. In this case it is Article 
1 of the NPT that clearly articulates the principle that becoming a nuclear power is not a 
universal sovereign (NPT, 1970).  Additionally, Article 5 of Resolution 44/215 stipulates that 
developed nations should refrain from sanctions that are “incompatible with the provisions of the 
charter of the United Nations,” but in this case it is actually the sanctions themselves that are 
encouraging compliance with the Charter’s provisions. Article 1(1), for example, expresses the 
primary purpose of the Charter as a whole; the maintenance of international peace and security 
(UN, 1945). Any number of the Iranian policies enumerated in Part 1 of this paper, which are the 
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target of American economic sanctions, are certainly contrary to this objective. For these reasons 
current American sanctions levied against Iran do not violate the international legal principle 
prohibiting coercive action against another state.  
 The final aspect of law that is important in determining coercive action is found in the 
same provision of the U.S. legal code used to define international terrorism in Part 3 of this 
paper. Just as U.S. action is held to the standards of international law that it has either signed on 
to or have become customary, the state is also perceived as responsible for it own domestic legal 
obligations. U.S. Legal Code Title 18−2331(b)(2) defines international terrorism as an act that 
“appears to be intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion” 
(U.S. Legal Code Title 18-2331, 2011). Differing from the Charter of Economic Rights & Duties 
of States’ prohibition on sanctions as a form of coercive action (explained above), Title 18-2231 
does not limit the prohibition against sanctions to attempts to secure advantages from another 
state, but includes acts of intimidation. In this regard, it is important to evaluate the provision 
separate from CERDS.  
 As explained above, it is certainly the case that the goal of current American sanctions is 
to influence policies of the Iranian government; sanctions are levied against Iran because of its 
violation of a number of other elements of the same legal code. For example, Title18-2331(a) 
defines terrorism as “involving violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” (U.S. Legal Code 
Title 18-2331, 2011). As explained in Part 3 of this paper, Iran is clearly guilty of this types of 
violent action against its citizens and, since it is a stated goal of American sanctions policy that 
efforts are predicated on a concerned effort to end these human rights violations, an American 
violation of Title 18-2231 does not make sanctions illegal.  In other words, sanctions against Iran 
are levied as a response to egregious violations of the same legal code (some of which have the 
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potential to directly harm the United States, e.g. the plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador), and it 
would, therefore, be difficult for Iran or any other nation to use the code as a basis for claiming 
American sanctions are illegal or illegitimate.  
 In addition to the established norm of a prohibition against coercive action, international 
law also stipulates that sanctions may not utilize food resources in an attempt to accomplish their 
objectives. Originally articulated Article 54 of 1977’s Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva 
Convention, all objects that are indispensable to the survival of civilian populations may not be 
used as a means of applying political pressure. Most notably these “objects” refer to food, as 
stipulated in Art. 54(1);  “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited” (Geneva 
Convention, 1977).  Art. 54(2) expands on this regulation by making it illegal to attack or 
destroy objects “indispensable to the agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works” (Geneva Convention, 
1977). This international norm was reaffirmed in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. 
Article 31 of the WCHR “affirms that food should not be used as a tool for political pressure” 
(U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 1993). Based on these two sources it is clear that regardless of their 
goals/purpose, legal sanctions may not target the sustenance of any civilian population. Once 
again, as explained above, while American sanctions certainly hope to put political stress to the 
current Iranian regime, they do not use food or water as the mechanism to apply that pressure. 
Sanctions against Iran are purely financial and diplomatic in nature and although they include 
substantial trade barriers, the United States has gone out of its way to ensure that sanctions do 
not restrict the flow of food to the Iranian people. In fact, the United States deliberately did not 
include restrictions on the trade of food in sanctions and today the U.S. still engages in 
agricultural trade with Iran (Clawson, 2011).  According to Patrick Clawson, the Director of 
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Research at the Washington Center for Near East Policy, Iran is still a large food importer from 
the United States, in some years buying as much as $200 million of U.S. wheat (Clawson, 2011). 
Ultimately, it is clear that American sanctions do not violate the international legal norm 
prohibiting the use of food as political pressure. This evaluation, in conjunction with the 
determination that sanctions do not represent coercive actions, makes current American sanctions 
legal under international law.  
5.8—Concluding Remarks and the Future Applications of Sanctions  
 As in the previous section dealing with the use of force, this paper does not make an 
argument that sanctions have or have not been successful in achieving American foreign policy 
objectives with regard to Iran. It is still important, however, to explore the possible future 
application of the policy. Legally, as long as the United States continues to refrain from 
infringing on sovereign rights and using food as political pressure, sanctions will remain a 
permissible foreign policy tool under international law. Beyond the legality of the policy, 
however, the future of American sanctions against Iran is strong, especially when considered in 
light of growing international backing that provides an additional layer of legitimacy for the 
policy. “U.S. sanctions were widely criticized in the 1990s for being unilateral, yet U.S. action 
was eventually a spur to a broad international consensus, including a series of U.N. sanctions 
since 2007. By 2010, European governments that had long criticized U.S. sanctions policy had 
adopted much the same approach, imposing restrictions on wide swatches of the Iranian 
economy” (Clawson, 2011). Sanctions have also received support from multinational 
corporations who no longer see doing business in Iran as worth the trouble. American companies 
including Caterpillar and GE (which were not restricted under American sanctions) and foreign 
firms such as Siemens and Toyota, have pulled out of the Iranian market voluntarily. Today, the 
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American policy is no longer an international outlier, and there is broad agreement that sanctions 
are necessary in the attempt to pressure Iran to comply with its international obligations 
(Clawson, 2011). While the future for sanctions under international law seems bright, it is 
ultimately unclear how much change in provocative policies they will create. For this reason, the 
question of at what point the United States and other members of the international community 
should turn to more hostile foreign policy action remains central to political debate.  
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Conclusion   
 With over 50% of the world’s remaining oil resources, many scholars consider the 
Persian Gulf to be the most geo-strategically important region in the modern world (Milani, 
2009, p.349). Because of its resource endowment and identity cleavages, however, the Gulf has 
also been plagued by internal and external conflict as different actors attempt to exert influence 
in the region. The Persian Gulf has a long history of foreign intervention on the part of many 
imperial actors whose primary interest was promoting stability to ensure secure energy exports. 
In 2003, however, the United States departed from traditional goals and instead embarked on an 
ambitious effort to reshape the international and domestic politics of the region (Gause, 2010, 
p.14) By overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his Sunni government in Iraq, the United States 
both reentrenched its interests and drastically changed the geopolitical composition of the 
Persian Gulf. The implication of these political and security developments have been the creation 
of many new realities for the region, the most important of which is a leadership vacuum 
amongst regional powers. 
 Considered by the Western World to be an international pariah, Iran has emerged as the 
likely candidate to fill the regional leadership gap in the Persian Gulf, expanding its regional and 
international influence. In pursuit of becoming that regional hegemon, the leading power that 
dominates in a subordinate state system sets the rules and utilizes its influence and power 
projections to accomplish its foreign policy objectives, Iran has attempted to take advantage of 
the new opportunities it faces in the region (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.40, and Myers, 1991, p.5). 
Iran’s hegemonic aspirations are based on three broad factors: threat perception, domestic 
politics, and foreign policy goals. In terms of threat perception, the pursuit of regional hegemony 
allows Iran to confront the United States on the ideological playing field (rather than through 
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military conflict) and attempt to unify the Gulf States against perceived American imperialism. 
The pursuit of regional hegemony also benefits Iran’s domestic politics as increased regional 
influence allows the leadership of the Islamic Republic to increase its legitimacy by diverting 
attention away from internal problems. Finally, achieving regional hegemony would also help 
Iran accomplish its foreign policy goals that include the protection of Shi’i interests worldwide, 
exporting the Islamic revolution, and achieving recognition as a global power. In order to realize 
this regional goal, however, Iran has employed a number of actions that have created controversy 
throughout the international world.  
 Manifestations of the Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony include the state’s attempt to 
build a security umbrella, treatment of civil/political society, and power politics. Policies in each 
of these areas enable the current Iranian regime to remain in power and project influence 
throughout the region. The actions also, however, threaten the geopolitical interests of the United 
States, and have placed the two states on a crash course for conflict with one another. Today, the 
“Iranian Question” rivals U.S. led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as the dominant topic in 
American foreign policy debate. Although subtleties within this debate break down along party 
lines, there is broad agreement that the current trajectory of provocative Iranian policies, most 
notably the state’s nuclear program, could dramatically harm American interests and are worthy 
of American foreign policy action. Taking a backseat in this political debate, however, is the 
question of how international law influences a potential justification for action. As the United 
States experienced in the aftermath of the Iraq War, this irresponsible omission in public 
discourse could lead to serious consequences for future American multilateral action. 
Additionally, if international law took a more prominent place in American foreign policy action, 
it would be easier for the United States to work towards global objectives, such as inspiring 
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freedom and justice for all people. For these reasons, international law is the perfect framework 
for painting a comprehensive picture of the “Iranian Question”.  
 In order to understand what potential American actions towards Iran are legal, it is 
necessary to begin with a discussion of how current Iranian policies align with international law. 
Today, elements of Iran’s nuclear program, human rights violations, and support of international 
terrorism constitute egregious violations of international law and legitimate grounds for anger on 
behalf on many other states. These policies do not necessarily, however, afford powerful actors a 
legal justification for any interventionist action in Iranian domestic and foreign politics. For this 
reason, it is important to turn back to international law and reexamine its applicability from the 
perspective of those states that are poised to take a pro-active approach to the hostile Iranian 
regime. 
 Potential American foreign policy responses to provocative Iranian actions could take the 
form of diplomatic, economic, and even military action as the U.S. attempts to pressure Iran to 
comply with its international obligations and decrease hostility. Currently, however, the U.S. is 
restricted to a very limited set of foreign policies that are legal under international law. In terms 
of the use of force, because the United States has not yet been impacted directly by Iranian 
hostility, only cyber-attacks that targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure are legal under 
international law. Computer attacks, which have already been used against Iran in an American 
and/or Israeli action, represent a lawful countermeasure against Iranian breeches of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the state’s Safeguards Agreement. Additionally, American 
sanctions, which have been the primary foreign policy tool used against Iran since the Islamic 
Revolution, are not contrary to the international legal obligations of the United States. Originally 
deployed by Ronald Reagan and updated to more restrictive manifestations by each subsequent 
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presidential administration, sanctions derive their modern legality from two primary principles. 
First, they do not do not violate the international legal norm prohibiting the use of food as 
political pressure. Second, they are aimed at forcing Iranian compliance with international legal 
obligations to which the United States is also party and therefore do not represent unlawful 
coercive action.   
 With respect to future research, so long as Iran and the United States continue on their 
foreign policy trajectories, international law will continue to be an important lens through which 
potential American action must be evaluated. As geopolitical circumstances are always 
changing, legal analysis of U.S.—Iran relations will be in constant need of reevaluation. In this 
regard, while some American foreign policy responses are illegal under international law today, 
it is only through future analysis that potential justifications for those responses can be explored.  
 The dynamic relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
today seems to place the policies of the two states on a crash course for one another. A careful 
consideration of how international law plays into this predicament has, however, been recklessly 
absent from public political discourse, often making it seem like American politicians are not 
adequately considering the international responsibilities of the U.S. In order to make informed 
foreign policy decisions moving forward, the United States must consider potential action in 
light of both current Iranian geopolitical aspirations and violations of its international 
obligations. Perhaps more importantly, however, American action must be considered in the 
context of the state’s own international legal commitments. Although the ultimate foreign policy 
path of the United States may not totally conform to international law, any analysis that ignores 
this crucial piece of the puzzle is overwhelmingly and dangerously incomplete.  
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Appendix  
 
Key Terms 
 
Acronyms: 
EIF—Entry Into Force 
NPT—Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons  
Safeguards—IAEA Safeguards Agreement 
P&I—Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA 
NOT—Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
ASSIST—Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
 Emergency 
RSA—Revised Supplemental Agreement Concerning Provisions of Technical Assistance by the 
 IAEA 
ICCPR—International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR—International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Rights of the Child—Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CEAFRD—Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
ICSFT—International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
CCIT—Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism  
CERDS—Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
UNGA—United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC—United Nations Security Council 
ICJ—International Court of Justice (Case) 
 
Terms: 
Cross-Apply—Violations of the specific article are the same as those that violate the a different 
article of another treaty referenced in the Appendix (cross-applications are followed by direction 
to other(s) applicable sources) 
Signature—Denotes Iranian signature to specific convention/treaty 
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Appendix A—Nuclear Program: Violations of Iran’s International Obligations 
 
a. NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Signature: 1968, EIF: 1970) 
 1) Uranium Imports—Art. 3(1-2)  
−Iran failed to report its purchase of uranium (1,000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of UF4, 
and 400 kg of UO2) from China in 1991 (Shire & Albright, 2006, p.2) 
 2) Uranium Conversion—Art. 3(1) 
  −Iran failed to report its use of imported uranium in uranium conversion processes 
  to the IAEA (Shire & Albright, 2006, p.2) 
  −Uranium uses included “uranium dissolution, purification using pulse columns,  
  and the production of uranium metal, and the associated production and loss of  
  nuclear material” (IAEA, 2003) 
 3) Uranium Enrichment—Art. 3(1)  
  −Iran failed to report its use of 1.9 kg of imported UF6 in testing of a centrifuge in 
  1999 and several centrifuges in 2002 (Shire & Albright, 2006, p.2) 
  −Iran also failed to declare its production (and processing) of enriched and  
  depleted uranium, in violation to its Safeguard Agreement of 1947 (Bruno,  
  2010 and IAEA, 2003 and Shire & Albright, 2006, p.2) 
 4) Hidden Sites—Art. 3(1) 
  −Iran failed to report the existence of several nuclear sites to the IAEA (including  
  an enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company Workshop and laser  
  enrichment plants at the Tehran Nuclear Research center and at Lashkar Ab’ad)  
  (Shire & Albright, 2006, p.2) 
  −Since these sites housed nuclear material and equipment used in    
  experimentation, Iran was required to report them to the IAEA (Shire & Albright,  
  2006, p.3) 
  −Iran also failed to report its construction and design details of new facilities in  
  violation of its Safeguard Agreement of 1974 (e.g. the newly constructed facility  
  at Qom) (Bruno, 2010 and IAEA, 2003) 
 5) Laser Isotope Enrichment Experiments—Art. 3(1) 
−Iran failed to report its importation of 50 kg of natural uranium metal in1993 that 
it  used for atomic vapor isotope separation and experimentation between 1999-
2003 (Shire &Albright, 2006, p.3) 
 6) Plutonium Experiments—Art. 3(1) 
  −Iran failed to report its production of uranium dioxide (UO2) targets, and its  
  subsequent plutonium separation from the irradiated targets between 1988-1993  
  (Shire & Albright, 2006, p.3) 
  −Iran also failed to report the production and transfer of waste associated with  
  these activities (Shire & Albright, 2006, p.3) 
 7) Potential Violation of Art. 2 and Art. 4 
  −“The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon  
  parties undertake ‘not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or  
  other nuclear explosive devices,’ and Article IV, which provides that nothing in  
  the Treaty is to be interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty ‘to  
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  develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in  
  conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.’” (Kerr, 2011, p.17) 
b. IAEA Safeguards Agreement (Signature: 1968, EIF: 1970) and Application (Signature: 
1973, EIF: 1974) 
Note: The Safeguards Agreement comes in accordance with Art. 3(1) of the NPT 
 1) Failure to Declare Uranium Imports and Transfer to the IAEA 
  −Iran failed to report its purchase of uranium (1,000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of UF4,  
  and 400 kg of UO2) from China in 1991 (Shire & Albright, 2006, p.2 and Kerr,  
  2011, p.12) 
 2) Failure to Declare Processing and Use of Uranium to the IAEA 
−Iran has failed to report the “processing and use of the imported natural uranium, 
including the production and loss of nuclear material, and the production and 
transfer of resulting waste” (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
 3) Failure to Declare Nuclear Facilities to the IAEA 
  −Nuclear facilities house and process nuclear material and waste (Kerr, 2011,  
  p.12) 
 4) Failure to Provide Reactor Information to the IAEA 
  −Iran failed to provide information regarding its research reactor in Tehran and on 
  two waste storage sites in a timely manner (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
 5) Failure to Report Uranium Conversion Experiments to the IAEA 
 6) Failure to Report Importation and Use of Other Nuclear Materials to the IAEA 
  −Use of uranium hexafluoride for testing centrifuges, and the production of  
  enriched and depleted uranium (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
  −Import of natural uranium metal, and transfer for use in laser enrichment   
  experiments (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
  −Production of enriched uranium and resulting waste (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
  −Production of many nuclear compounds from imported materials and the  
  production/transfer of resulting waste (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
  −Production, irradiation and processing of uranium targets in the Tehran Research 
  Reactor (including separation of plutonium) (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
 7) Failure to Provide Design Information of Nuclear-Related Facilities to the IAEA 
  −A centrifuge testing facility (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
  −Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed  
  (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
  −Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds (Kerr,  
  2011, p.12) 
  −The Tehran Research Reactor, the hot cell facility where the plutonium   
  separation took place, as well as the relevant waste handling facility (Kerr, 2011,  
  p.12) 
 8) Failure to Cooperate with the IAEA 
  −Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation  
  of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities (Kerr, 2011, p.12) 
c. IAEA Multilateral Agreements 
 1) P&I: Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA (Accepted: 1974, EIF:  
 1974) 
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  −No current violations  
 2) NOT: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Signature: 1986, 
 Ratification: 2000, EIF: 2000) 
  −No current violations  
 3) ASSIST: Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
 Emergency (Signature: 1986, Ratification 2000, EIF: 2000) 
  −No current violations  
 4) RSA: Revised Supplemental Agreement Concerning Provisions of Technical 
 Assistance by the IAEA (Signature 1990, EIF: 1990) 
  −Peaceful Application of Atomic Energy (No Nuclear Weapons Production)— 
  Art. 3(1) 
   ⋅The most recent IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear activities indicates that  
   Iran has carried out a number of activities specifically related to the  
   development of a nuclear weapon and explosive devises (IAEA, 2011,  
   p.8)  
   ⋅Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use   
   equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities  
   (IAEA, 2011, p.8) 
   ⋅Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear  
   material (IAEA, 2011, p.8) 
   ⋅The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and   
   documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network( IAEA, 2011,  
   p.8) 
   ⋅Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon  
   including the testing of components (IAEA, 2011, p.8) 
d. Convention on Nuclear Safety 
 Note: Iran is not a signatory to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and is the only nuclear 
power outside the CNS   
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Appendix B—Human Rights: Violations of Iran’s International Obligations 
 
a. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (Signature: 1968, Ratification: 1975, 
EIF: 1976) 
 1) Discrimination Against Women—Art. 3 
  −Codification in law of women as the “inferior sex” (NEPR, 2011, p.5)  
  -Inequality of women in inheritance, marriage, divorce, and family life (NEPR,  
  2011, p. 5)  
  −Arrest, imprisonment, and execution (also violations of Art. 7) 
   ⋅Extremely harsh punishments for women (NEPR, 2011, p.6) 
   ⋅Systematic rape of female prisoners (NEPR, 2011, p.6)  
  −Social restrictions 
   ⋅E.g. forced veiling (NEPR, 2011, p.7) 
  −The unequal treatment of women in the political realm is codified in three  
  different sources of Iranian law: the state’s Constitution, penal code, and civil  
  code 
   ⋅Cross-apply list of violations against women in Appendix E  
 2) Right to Life—Art. 6(2) 
  −Death penalty  
   ⋅Cruel sentences (cross-apply Art.7) such as public hangings and the  
   stoning of women (cross-apply Art. 3) (NEPR, 2011, p.7) 
   ⋅For petty crimes such as theft, drug trafficking, adultery, and expression  
   of political or religious thought (NEPR, 2011, p.7) 
   ⋅Excessive use; between 66-83 people were executed in January 2011  
   alone (NEPR, 2011, p.7) 
  −Arbitrary killings 
   ⋅Most often carried out as sentences for political prisoners accused of  
   Moharebeh (enmity against God, that has come to include any action that  
   is anti-regime) (NEPR, 2011, p.9) 
   ⋅Often take place inside Iranian jails/prisons (NEPR, 2011, p.10)  
  −Excessive use of force by law enforcement and armed forces 
   ⋅Against unarmed and peaceful protestors (e.g. Summer 2009) (NEPR,  
   2011, p.11) 
 3) Death Penalty for Children Under the Age of Eighteen—Art. 6(5) 
  −According to Amnesty International, Iran is the only state that officially executes 
  children under the age of eighteen who are accused of crimes (NEPR, 2011, p.11  
  and Amnesty International, 2007, p.2-4) 
  −Since 1990 Iran has executed 23 children for crimes committed before the age of 
  eighteen (Amnesty International, 2007, p.31-32)  
  −There are currently 71 children on death row in Iran (Amnesty International,  
  2007, p.33-38) 
 4) Torture—Art. 7 
  −Against dissidents in prisons 
Siegel, 119 
   ⋅E.g. Prisoners kept in solitary confinement, breaking bones, beatings with 
   electric batons, deliberate denial of medical treatment, rape, other   
   violations of physical/mental dignity/integrity, etc. (NEPR, 2011, p.11-13) 
  −Forced confessions to political crimes against the regime (Glass, 2007) 
 5) Arbitrary Detention—Art. 9 
  −According to Amnesty International flaws in the Penal Code and Code of  
  Criminal Procedure allow for the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention (NEPR, 
  2011, p. 13) 
 6) Conditions of Detention—Art. 10 
  −Inhumane conditions in prisons and detention centers throughout the country  
  (NEPR, 2011, p. 14)  
  −Cross-apply violations of Art. 7 for specific examples 
  −Families and lawyers are routinely denied access to their relatives and clients  
  being held in prisons (NEPR, 2011, p. 15) 
 7) Lack of Respect for Religious Faiths—Art. 18(4)  
  −Religious worship locations of minority faiths are often ransacked or destroyed  
  by regime forces  
 8) Freedom of Thought, Consciousness, and Religion—Art. 18(1) 
  −According to Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution only members of three  
  religious minorities are recognized under the law (Zoroastrians, Jews, and   
  Christians) (CERD, 2003, p.11) 
   ⋅All other religions are not allowed to exercise their faith freely, or exist as 
   organized religious communities (CERD, 2003, p.11) 
 8) Freedom of Association—Art. 22(1)  
  −Prohibited certain organizations  
   ⋅Restrictions on opposition political parties, trade unions, etc. (NEPR,  
   2011, p.15) 
 9) Restrictions on Association—Art. 22(2-3) 
  −Article 186 of the Islamic Punishment Act states that “All members or   
  supporters of an organized group or association which has opposed the Islamic  
  State with arms shall be regarded as enemies of God” (NEPR, 2011, p.15) 
  −The regime considers the chanting of slogans and distribution of opposition  
  information as capital offenses (NEPR, 2011, p.16) 
  −Murder of opposition leadership 
 10) Religious Minorities—Art. 27 
  −Arrest of those practicing minority faiths (NEPR, 2011, p.17) 
  −Disruption of religious ceremonies, meetings, and events (NEPR, 2011, p.17-18) 
b. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Signature: 1968, 
Ratification 1975, EIF: 1976) 
 1) Discrimination—Art. 2(2) 
  −Discriminatory laws against women, religious minorities, and political   
  opposition (cross-apply violations of the ICCPR Art. 3, Art. 18, and Art. 22),  
  permeate many other aspects of Iranian society protected under the ICESCR  
   ⋅Many companies recruit and employ Muslims only (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 
   2006, p.2) 
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   ⋅Many companies consider creed and/or origin of the applicant in their  
   selection criteria (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 2006, p.2) 
   ⋅A total of only 3.5 million women in Iran are salaried employees,   
   compared to 23.5 million men (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 2006, p.2) 
   ⋅For a comprehensive list of official state laws against women see   
   Appendix E  
 2) Equal Rights of Men and Women—Art. 3 
  −The unequal treatment of women in the economic/social/cultural realm is  
  codified in three different sources of Iranian law: the state’s Constitution, penal  
  code, and civil code 
   ⋅For a comprehensive list of official state laws against women see   
   Appendix E  
 3) Right to Work—Art. 6  
  −Women's rights activists repeatedly complain that the Iranian authorities target  
  their employment and right to work because of their activities (IHRDC, 2011) 
   ⋅Authorities strip benefits and pressured employers to fire their employees  
   (IHRDC, 2011)  
  −Female professors have been stripped of their teaching posts at universities for  
  advocating women and children’s rights (IHRDC, 2011) 
 4) Labor Associations—Art. 8(2) 
  −Many large companies have banned the formation of labor unions (Omidvar &  
  Ebrahim, 2006, p.2) 
  −Associations are subject to disbandment by the government, and leaders are  
  often subject to arrest (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 2006, p.3) 
 5) Child Labor—Art. 10(3) 
  −Many small Iranian business (mostly those operating in rural areas) utilize  
  children to reduce their human resource cost (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 2006, p.2) 
  −Estimates suggest that between three million and five million Iranian children  
  currently live under the poverty line and between 750,000 and 1,250,000 children  
  are working (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 2006, p.2) 
  −Although Iran has not ratified any international convention defining a minimum  
  age for work, domestic law stipulates that children must be over the age of fifteen  
  to be employed (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 2006, p.2) 
   ⋅Numerous loopholes in law, however, allow for children younger than  
   fifteen to work in domestic workshops and homes without legal protection 
   (Omidvar & Ebrahim, 2006, p.2) 
 7) Cultural Persecution—Art. 15(1)(a) 
  −Restrictions of freedom of religion  
   ⋅Poor treatment of religious minorities, most notably Baha’is and Sunni  
   Muslims, who are not recognized by the Iranian Constitution (Hassan,  
   2008, p.7-8)  
   ⋅Sunni Muslims complain that there is not one Sunni mosque in the  
   country and that the government has banned public displays of Sunni  
   religion and culture  
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   ⋅Baha’is are barred from teaching and/or practicing their faith within Iran  
   and are not allowed to maintain relationships with co-religionists abroad   
   (Hassan, 2008, p.7-8) 
   ⋅Christians and Jews also receive sub-equal treatment (Hassan, 2008, p.7- 
  −Poor treatment of major ethnic minority groups (Hassan, 2008, p.7-8) 
   ⋅Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis (the four major ethnic minority  
   groups in Iran) do not receive equal treatment by the Iranian government  
   and all have been involved with violent clashes with Iran’s revolutionary  
   guards (Hassan, 2008, p. 5-6) 
c. Universal Declaration of Human Rights   
 Note (1): Although the UDHR is not a treaty in and of itself, its purpose was to define the 
terms “fundamental freedoms” and “human rights” appearing in the United Nations Charter 
and is therefore binding on all states 
 Note (2): The Empire of Iran (i.e. Iran under the reign of the Shah) voted for the 
declaration when it was initially adopted 
 1) Rights Endowed Without Distinction—Art. 2 
  −Race/Color/Religion/National Origin 
   ⋅Cross-apply violations of Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR 
  −Sex 
   ⋅Cross-apply violations of Art. 3 ICCPR and Art. 3 ICESCR 
  −Political or Other Opinion  
   ⋅Cross-apply violations of Art. 5(d)(vii) CEAFRD  
 2) Life, Liberty, Security of Person—Art. 3 
  −Cross apply all violations ICCPR and ICESCR 
 3) Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Punishment—Art. 5 
  −Cross-apply violations Art. 7 ICCPR 
 4) Equality Before the Law—Art. 7 
  −Cross-apply violations Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR and Appendix E 
 5) Arbitrary Arrest/Detention—Art. 9 
  −Cross-apply violations of Art. 9 ICCPR 
 6) Privacy—Art. 12 
  −Cross-apply violations Art. 17 Rights of the Child 
 7) Thought/Consciousness/Religion—Art. 18 
  −Cross-apply violations Art. 18(1), Art. 18(4), and Art. 27ICCPR 
 8) Opinion and Expression—Art. 19  
  −Cross-apply violations Art. 5(d)(vii) CEAFRD 
 9) Peaceful Assembly/Association—Art. 20 
  −Cross-apply violations of Art. 22(1) and Art. 2-3 ICCPR and Art. 15 Rights of  
  the Child  
 10) Equal Access to Public Service—Art. 21(2) 
  −Cross-apply Art. 115 and Art. 162 of the Iranian Constitution  
   ⋅Women may not hold the office of Iranian President nor the office of 
   Attorney General respectively  
 11) Will of the People Shall Be the Basis of the Authority of Government—Art. 21(3) 
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  −The 2009 reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was affected by  
  significant fraud showing that supreme authority in the state is well outside of the  
  people’s control (Mebane, 2009, p.21).    
 12) Employment without Discrimination—Art. 23(2) 
  −Cross-apply violations Art. 6 ICESCR 
 13) Right to Join trade Unions—Art. 23(4) 
  −Cross-apply violations Art. 22(1) ICCPR  
 15) Cultural Life 
  −Cross-apply violations of Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR 
d. Convention on the Rights of the Child (Signature: 1991, Ratification: 1994, EIF: 1990) 
 Note: In its ratification of the convention on July 13, 1994 the Iran made the following 
reservation; “If the text of the Convention is or becomes incompatible with the domestic laws 
and Islamic standards at any time or in any case, the Government of the Islamic Republic shall 
not abide by it” (LLC, 2011). 
 1) Discrimination—Art. 2(1−2) 
  −Children in Iran are persecuted on the same cultural, ethnic, religious, and sexual 
  basis as their parents  
  −For violating examples of discrimination see Art.3 ICCPR, Art. 2(2) ICESCR,  
  and Ar.t 15(1)(a) ICESCR 
 2) Preservation of Identity—Art.8(1) 
  −Because of the institutionalized discrimination of women and minorities in Iran  
  it is impossible for children to preserve their identity free from persecution  
 3) Freedom of Expression—Art. 13 
  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 5(d)(vii) CEAFRD 
 4) Freedom of Thought/Conscious/Religion—Art. 14 
  −For violating examples of freedom of thought/conscious/expression see Art.  
  15(1)(a) ICESCR 
 5) Freedom of Association—Art. 15 
  −Government restrictions placed on the freedom of peaceful association (e.g.  
  political demonstrations, rallies for the rights of women/minorities, etc.) (UNGA,  
  2009, p.14)  
 6) Privacy—Art. 16 
  −Many Iranian families (particularly those who engage in activism) are subject to  
  unlawful surveillance and communication harassment (IHRDC, 2011)  
 7) Freedom of Information—Art. 17 
  −Since the protests following the Presidential election of 2009, Iranian authorities 
  have waged an active campaign against freedom of information, specifically on  
  the internet (RDC, 2011) 
   ⋅“As of December 2010, all the major international social−networking and 
   media sharing websites like Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr were   
   blocked” (RDC, 2011) 
 8) Freedom of Religious Practice—Art. 30 
  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR 
 9) Child Labor—Art. 32 
  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 10(3) ICESCR  
 10) Death Penalty for Children Under the Age of Eighteen—Art. 37(a) 
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  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 6(5) ICCPR 
e. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Signature: 1967, 
Ratification: 1968, EIF: 1969) 
 Note: Art. 1(1) of the convention states that the term “racial discrimination” shall mean 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and freedoms in the political, 
economic, cultural, or any other field of life. 
 1) State Practice, Promotion, and Support of Racial Discrimination—Art. 2(1)(a) and Art. 
 2(1)(b) 
  −Cross−apply Art. 3 ICCPR,  
 2) Political Rights—Art. 5(c)  
  −Cross−apply all violations ICCPR 
 3) Right to Nationality—Art 5(d)(iii)  
  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR 
 4) Right to Freedom of Thought/Conscious/Religion—Art. 5(d)(vii) 
  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 18(1),  Art. 18(4), and Art. 27  ICCPR, 2(2) and  
  Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR, and rights against women in Appendix E  
 5) Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression—Art. 5(d)(vii) 
  −By violently putting down demonstrations against the current regime and jailing  
  those who speak out against its policies, Iran has effectively criminalized   
  legitimate peaceful expression for all Amnesty International, 2009 and UNGA,  
  2009, p.13−14) 
 6) Right of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association 
  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 22(1) and Art. 2−3 ICCPR and Art. 15 Rights of  
  the Child  
 7) Right to Work—Art. 5(e)(i) 
  −Cross−apply violations of Art.5 ICCSCR  
 8) Participation in Cultural Activities Art. 5(e)(iv) 
  −Cross−apply violations of Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR 
 9) Adoption of Measures—Art. 7 
  −The UN condemned the failure of the Iranian government to implement the  
  principles of the CEAFRD in Resolution A/RES/62/168 
   ⋅The General Assembly expressed “its deep concern at the ongoing  
   systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the  
   people of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as described in the    
   above−referenced resolutions (ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEAFRD), and at  
   the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement the steps called for 
   in these resolutions 
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Appendix C—Support of International Terrorism: Violations of Iran’s 
International Obligations 
 
a. Defining Terrorism  
 Note: There is no agreed upon/codified international definition of terrorism (a proposed 
definition from the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that holds broad 
international agreement can be viewed below) 
 1) Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism—Proposed Treaty   
  −Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that  
  person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: 
   ⋅(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
   ⋅(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of  
   public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system,  
   an infrastructure facility or the environment; or 
   ⋅(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in  
   paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major   
   economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context,  
   is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an   
   international organization to do or abstain from doing any act 
 2) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
   Note: Although the convention does not define “terrorism” explicitly, Art. 
2(1)(a−b) outlaws specific offences, providing a de facto definition for terrorism (see below) 
  −Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that  
  person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or  
  collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that  
  they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: 
   ⋅(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined 
   in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or 
   ⋅(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a  
   civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in 
   a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
   context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an  
   international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act 
  Note: For a comprehensive list of Iran’s violations of the ICSFT 
 3) U.S. Legal Code Title 18−2331—(1) “International Terrorism” 
  −(a) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
  criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal  
  violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; 
   −(b) appear to be intended— 
   ⋅(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
    ⋅(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;  
   or 
   ⋅(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,   
   assassination, or kidnapping; and 
  −(c) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or  
  transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are   
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  accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the  
  locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum 
b. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (EIF: 2001) 
 1) Prevent and Suppress the Financing of Terrorism—Art. 1(a) 
  −Iran provides Hizballah with $25−50 million dollars worth of assistance   
  annually    
  −Iran provides Hamas with $20−$30 million dollars worth of assistance annually 
 2) Support of Terrorist Acts—Art. 2(a) 
  −Cross−apply violations Res. 1373 Art. 1(a) 
   ⋅Support to Hizballah and Hamas takes the form of direct financial   
   transfers, military hardware, safe haven for leadership, and training of  
   fighters (Cordesman, 2006, p.3 and Byman, 2008, 172) 
  −October 2011 commissioned plot to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the  
  United States by conspiring with a Mexican Drug cartel (Cooper, 2011, p.1) 
 3) Necessary Steps to Thwart Terrorist Activity—Art 2(b−g)  
  −Iran has not taken steps to deny safe haven, prevent from operating within  
  national boarders, bring to justice, assist other nations in investigations/criminal  
  proceedings, or prevent the movement of the terrorist groups it supports   
 4) Cooperation with Other Nations Art. 3(a−g) 
  −Iran has not cooperated with any other nations in order to prevent terrorist  
  activities  
c. UN Security Council Resolution 1377 (EIF: 2001) 
 1) Call Upon All States to Intensify Efforts to Eliminate International Terrorism 
  −Cross−apply violations of Res. 1373  
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Appendix D—Trade Policy: Violations of Iran’s International Obligations 
 
a. UN Law of the Seas (Signature: 1982, Ratification: Pending EIF: 1994) 
 Note (1): The United States has signed but not ratified the UN Law of the Seas 
 Note (2): Iran has signed but not ratified the UN Law of the Seas 
 −No current violations  
b. World Trade Organization Status  
 Note: Iran is not a member, but currently holds observer status at the World Trade 
Organization (its application for official membership is pending) (WTO, 2011) 
  ⋅Application submitted July 19, 1996 (WTO, 2011) 
  ⋅The General Council established a Working Party to examine the application of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran on May 26, 2005 (WTO, 2011) 
  ⋅The Islamic Republic of Iran submitted its Memorandum on the Foreign Trade 
Regime November 24, 2009 (WTO, 2011) 
  ⋅The Working Party has not yet met (WTO, 2011) 
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Appendix E—Women’s Rights: Violations of Iran’s International Obligations 
 
Violations of ICCPR Art. 3 and the ICESCR Art. 2(2) and Art. 3 
1) Iranian Passport Law (WFAFI, 2008, p.1−2) 
 −Art. 18 
  ⋅Married women are required to have their husband’s permission to apply for a  
  passport 
2) Iranian Constitution (WFAFI, 2008, p.1−2) 
 −Art. 21 
  ⋅The government must ensure that the rights of women conform to Islamic criteria 
  (clergy are the final arbiters to interpret laws pertaining to women) 
 −Art. 102 
  ⋅By penalty of flogging, women must appear in public (i.e. on the streets) with the 
  prescribed Islamic hejab 
 −Art. 115 
  ⋅Women may not hold the office of Iranian President  
 −Art. 162 
  ⋅Women may not hold the office of Attorney General  
 −Art. 167 
  ⋅In the absence of codified law, judges are required to defer to traditional Islamic  
  sources (i.e. authentic fatwa) when making legal rulings/judgments 
 −Art. 209 
  ⋅A women’s life is valued as only half as much as a man’s (if a man is convicted  
  of murdering a women his only punishment is to pay the women’s family a  
  ‘dayeh’ or stipulated sum of money) 
3) Iranian Penal Code (WFAFI, 2008, p.1−2) 
 −Art. 83 
  ⋅The penalty for fornication is flogging for unmarried female offenders 
 −Art. 102 
  ⋅There are different (more harmful) methods of stoning for female offenders 
 −Art. 300 
  ⋅The ‘dayeh’ of a women is half that of a man 
  ⋅A women’s share of an inheritance is half that of a man’s  
  ⋅Health care is entirely segregated on the basis of gender (seriously compromising 
  the health of women and girls since there are not enough health professionals  
  trained in female issues) 
4) Iranian Civil Code (WFAFI, 2008, p.1−2) 
 −Art. 105 
  ⋅Men are designated as “the head of the family” in all relationships  
  ⋅Women may not leave their home under any circumstances without their   
  husband’s permission 
 −Art. 114 
  ⋅Stipulates that men sentenced to stoning will be buried in a pit up to his waist,  
  while female offenders will be buried up to their neck to avoid escape 
 −Art. 1117 
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  ⋅A husband may disallow his wife from pursuing any profession he deems in  
  conflict with her character 
 −Art. 1133 
  ⋅A man can divorce his wife whenever he chooses (he does not need to giver her  
  any advanced notice) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Siegel, 129 
Appendix F—Use of Force: Applicable International Law 
 
a. Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ: 1984) 
 1) Defining the Use of Force (O’Connell, 2009, p.14) 
  −The use of force encompasses more than armed attacks and includes:  
   ⋅Economic Coercion  
   ⋅Political Coercion 
   ⋅Physical Force Not Involving Arms  
   ⋅Computer Attacks  
 
Applicable International Law—Subsection 1: Self Defense 
b. United Nations Charter (EIF: 1945) 
 1) Prohibition of the Use of Force—Article 2(4) (UN, 1945) 
  −Article 2—The Organization and its Member, in the pursuit of the Purposes  
  stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: 
   ⋅(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the  
   threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political   
   independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the  
   Purposes of the United Nations  
 2) Exception: Individual and Collective Self-Defense—Article 51 (UN, 1945) 
  −Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or  
  collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United  
  Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain  
  international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of  
  this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council  
  and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security  
  Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems  
  necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security 
c. The Caroline Doctrine (The Caroline Affair/Case: 1837)  
 1) Defining Self-Defense (Letter to Henry Fox, British minister in Washington D.C. from
 Daniel Webster, United States Secretary of State) 
  −“The use of self-defense should be confined to situations in which a government  
  can show the ‘necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving  
  no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’” (Kearley, 1999, p.325) 
 2) Preemptive/Anticipatory Self-Defense (Customary International Law, affirmation  
 Nuremberg Trials) 
  −The Caroline Test (Kearley, 1999, p.325) 
   ⋅Necessary: The use of force must be necessary because the threat is  
   imminent and thus pursing peaceful alternatives is not an option 
   ⋅Proportionality: The response must be proportionate to the threat (Tait,  
   2005, p.111) 
d. UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (EIF: 2001)* 
 1) Condemnation for 9/11 Attacks 
  −In condemnation for the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 the Security  
  Council unanimously adopted this resolution (UNSC, 2001) 
 2) Call for Terrorists to Be “Brought to Justice” 
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  −“Called on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the   
  perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of those terrorist attacks and stressed that  
  those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring them would be held   
  accountable” (UNSC, 2001) 
   ⋅Does not specify scope of legal retributive actions  
 3) Terrorism as a Human Rights Violation 
  −Tied acts of terrorism to Human Rights Violations  
   ⋅The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson said the  
   actions "strike at the fundamental human rights of every person and are  
   totally unacceptable" (UN News Centre, 2001) 
e. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (EIF: 2001)* 
 1) Reaffirmation of Condemnation for 9/11 Attacks  
      −Reaffirmed condemnation for the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001  
  expressed in UNSC Res. 1368 and unanimously adopted this resolution (UNSC,  
  2001) 
 2) Calls Upon Member States to Prevent/Suppress Terrorist Attacks  
  −Called on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts,  
  including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant  
  international conventions relating to terrorism (UNSC, 2001) 
   ⋅Does not specify what retributive actions become legal in the wake of  
   terrorist attacks on member states (UNSC, 2001) 
 
 *—Denotes International Law is Specific to Responses to Terrorism  
 
Applicable International Law—Subsection 2: Countermeasures 
f. International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Act 
 1) Defining Wrongful Acts—Article 3 (ILC, 2001, p.36) 
  −Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State   
   ⋅There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when:   
    (a) conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to  
    the State under international law; and  
    (b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international   
    obligation of the State. 
 2) Defining Countermeasures 
  −Non-violent retaliatory acts traditionally know as reprisals 
   ⋅Non-violent acts which are illegal in themselves, but become legal when  
   executed by one state in response to an earlier illegal act by another state  
   towards the former (Schachter, 1994, p.471) 
    “Measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international  
    obligations of an injured State  vis-à-vis the responsible State, if  
    they were not taken by the former in response to an internationally  
    wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessation and   
    reparation” (ILC, 2001, p.128) 
  −Legality of Countermeasures—Article 22 (ILC, 2001, p.75) 
   ⋅Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act 
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    “The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an 
    international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to 
    the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against  
    the latter State in accordance with chapter II of Part Three” 
   ⋅Reiteration by the ICJ—Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Janis &  
   Noyes, 2011, p.80) 
    “In order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain  
    conditions …In the first place it must be taken in response to a  
    previous international wrongful act of another State and must be  
    directed against that State” 
   −Legal Criterion for Countermeasures   
   ⋅The act constituting countermeasure must be taken in response to a  
   previous intentional wrongful act of another state and must be directed  
   against that state (see Art. 49) 
   ⋅The injured state must have already called upon the state committing the  
   wrongful act to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation,  
   but the request was refused (see Art. 52(1)(a)) 
   ⋅The countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered,  
   taking into account the rights in question (see Art. 51) 
   ⋅The purpose behind evoking the countermeasure is to induce the   
   wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations under international law  
   (see Art. 49(2)) 
    Therefore, the measure must be reversible 
 2) Scope of International Obligations—Article 33 (ILC, 2001, p. 94) 
  −(1) The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to  
  another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole,  
  depending in particular on the character and content of the international   
  obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. 
  −(2) This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international  
  responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other  
  than a State 
 3) Object and Limits of Countermeasures—Article 49 (ILC, 2001, p.129) 
  −(1) An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is  
  responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to  
  comply with its obligations under Part Two 
  −(2) Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being  
  of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the   
  responsible State 
  −(3) Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit 
  the resumption of performance of the obligations in question 
 4) Obligations Not Affected by Countermeasures—Article 50 (ILC, 2001, p. 131) 
  −(1) Countermeasures shall not affect: 
   ⋅(a) The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in 
   the Charter of the United Nations 
   ⋅(b) Obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights 
   ⋅(c) Obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals 
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   ⋅(d) Other obligations under peremptory norms of general international  
   law 
  −(2) A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations 
   ⋅(a) Under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the  
   responsible State 
   ⋅(b) To respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, 
   archives and document 
 5) Proportionality—Article 51 (ILC, 2001, p. 134) 
  −Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into  
  account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question 
 6) Conditions Relating to Resort to Countermeasures—Article 52 
  −(1) Before taking countermeasures, an injured State shall: 
   ⋅(a) Call upon the responsible State, in accordance with article 3, to fulfill  
   its obligations under Part Two 
   ⋅(b) Notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures  
   and offer to negotiate with that State 
  −(2) Notwithstanding  paragraph 1 (b), the injured State may take such urgent  
  countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its rights 
  −(3) Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already taken must be suspended  
  without undue delay if: 
   ⋅(a) The internationally wrongful act has ceased; and 
   ⋅(b) The dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the  
   authority to make decisions binding on the parties 
  −(4) Paragraph 3 does not apply if the responsible State fails to implement the  
  dispute settlement procedures in good faith 
 7) Termination of Countermeasures—Article 53 (ILC, 2001, p. 137) 
  −Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible State has  
  complied with its obligations under Part Two in relation to the internationally  
  wrongful act 
 8) Measures Taken by States Other than an Injured State—Article 54 (ILC, 2001, p. 138) 
  −This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article  
  48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful  
  measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation  
  in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation   
  breached 
   ⋅Commentary: “injured” States, as defined in article 42, are not the  
   only States entitled to invoke the responsibility of a State for an   
   internationally wrongful act under chapter I of this Part. Article 48   
   allows such invocation by any State, in the case of the breach of an  
   obligation to the international community as a whole, or by any   
   member of a group of States, in the case of other obligations   
   established for the protection of the collective interest of the group 
 
Applicable International Law—Subsection 3: Authorization of Force 
g. United Nations Charter (EIF: 1945) 
 1) Determination—Article 39  (UN, 1945) 
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  −The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,  
  breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or  
  decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to  
  maintain or restore international peace and security  
 2) Call for Compliance—Article 40 (UN, 1945) 
  −In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may,  
  before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for  
  in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional  
  measures, as it deems necessary or desirable 
  −Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or  
  position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of  
  failure to comply with such provisional measures 
 3) Non-Force Measures—Article 41 (UN, 1945) 
  −The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed  
  force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the  
  Members of the United Nations to apply such measures 
  −These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of  
  rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and  
  the severance of diplomatic relations 
 4) Authorization of Force—Article 42 
  −Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41  
  would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by  
  air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international  
  peace and security 
  −Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,  
  sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations 
h. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change (U.N. Doc. A/59/565: 
2004) 
 1) UNSC Criteria for Force Authorization (Janis & Noyes, 2011, p. 684)  
  −Article 207 
   ⋅(a) Seriousness of Threat: Is the threatened harm to State or human  
   security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie  
   the use of military force? 
   ⋅(b) Proper Purpose: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed  
   military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other  
   purposes or motives may be involved? 
   ⋅(c) Last Resort: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in  
   question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other  
   measures will not succeed 
   ⋅(d) Proportional Means: Are the scale, duration and intensity of the  
   proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in  
   question? (cross-apply Caroline Test principle of “proportionality”) 
   ⋅(e) Balance of Consequences: Is there a reasonable chance of the military  
   action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the   
   consequences of the action not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
   inaction? (cross-apply Caroline Test principle of “proportionality 
Siegel, 134 
Appendix G—Sanctions: Applicable International Law 
 
a. United Nations Charter (EIF: 1945) 
 1) Defining Sanctions  
  −The UN Charter does not explicitly define sanctions, but “‘sanctions’ are cited in 
  it as measures that the Security Council may take under Chapter VII against a  
  state in order to restore or maintain international peace and security” (Kondoch,  
  2001, p.269) 
  −“Sanctions may not include the use of armed force but may include the   
  interruption of economic relations and communications as well as the severance  
  of diplomatic relations” (Kondoch, 2001, p.269) 
 2) Types of Sanctions (Janis & Noyes, 2011, p. 970):  
  −Diplomatic Sanctions 
   ⋅Complete or partial interruption or severance of diplomatic   
   relations between states 
  −Economic Sanctions 
   ⋅Complete or partial interruption of economic relations between   
   states (e.g. import/export duties/bans,  
  −Transportation/Telecommunication Sanctions 
   ⋅Complete or partial interruption of transportation and/or    
   telecommunication connection between states  
  −Other Types of Sanctions 
   ⋅Military sanctions (e.g. arms embargos) 
   ⋅Sport sanctions (i.e. boycott of sporting events) 
 3) United Nations Sanctions—Article 41 (Janis & Noyes, 2011, p. 970) 
  −“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of  
  armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call  
  upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may  
  include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and rail, sea, air,  
  postal, telegraphic, and other means of communication, and the severance of  
  diplomatic relations.”  
   ⋅UNSC sanctions are multilateral and are binding on UN members states 
b. Charter of Economic Rights & Duties of States (U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281, 1974) 
 1) Coercive Action—Article 32 
  −“No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type  
  of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of  
  the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.”  
  (U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281, 1974) 
c. Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Convention (EIF: 1977)  
 1) Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population—Article 
 54  
  −(1) “Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.” (Geneva  
  Convention, 1977) 
  −(2) “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects   
  indispensable to the agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,  
  livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works, for the  
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  specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian   
  population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve 
  out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for an other motive.” (Geneva  
  Convention, 1977) 
d. UN General Assembly Resolution 44/215 (U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/215, 1989) 
 1) Coercive Action  
  −(4) “Calls upon the developed countries to refrain from exercising political  
  coercion through the application of economic instruments with the purpose of  
  inducing changes in the economic or social systems, as well as in the domestic or  
  foreign policies of other countries” (U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/215, 1989) 
   ⋅Cross-apply Art. 32 CERDS 
  −(5) “Reaffirms that developed countries should refrain from threatening or  
  applying trade and financial restrictions, blockades, embargoes, and other   
  economic sanctions, incompatible with the provisions of the charter of the United  
  Nations and in violation of the undertakings contracted multilaterally and   
  bilaterally against developing countries as a form of political and economic  
  coercion that affects their political, economic and social development.” (U.N.  
  Doc. A/RES/44/215, 1989) 
   ⋅Cross-apply Art. 32 CERDS 
e. World Conference on Human Rights (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 1993) 
 1) Prohibition on Food as Political Pressure—Article 31 
  −“The World Conference on Human Rights affirms that food should not be used  
  as a tool for political pressure.” (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 1993) 
   ⋅Cross-apply Geneva Convention Art. 54 
f. U.S. Legal Code Title 18−2331  
 1) “International Terrorism” (U.S. Legal Code Title 18-2331, 2011) 
  −(a) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
  criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal  
  violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; 
   −(b) appear to be intended— 
   ⋅(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
    ⋅(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;  
   or 
   ⋅(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,   
   assassination, or kidnapping; and 
  −(c) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or  
  transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are   
  accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the  
  locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum 
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Appendix H—American Sanctions Against Iran: Obama Administration Updates 
 
a. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
 1) Sec. 102—Expansion of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (CISADA, 
 2010, p.15) 
  −See principle categories of sanctions against Iran imposed by the Clinton 
administration above) 
 2) Sec. 103—Economic sanctions relating to Iran (CISADA, 2010, p.53) 
  −See principle categories 1-5 (in text) 
 3) Sec. 104—Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage in 
certain transactions (CISADA, 2010, p.63) 
  −Of or relating to the financing of international terrorism and/or money 
laundering (see 2011 update to Sec. 311 of the PATRIOT Act below) 
 4) Sec. 105—Imposition of sanctions on certain persons who are responsible for or 
complicit in human rights abuses committed against citizens of Iran or their family members 
after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran (CISADA, 2010, p.76) 
  −Note: Difference to individual/corporation specific sanctions imposed by E.O. 
13382 (see below) 
 6) Sec. 106—Prohibition on procurement contracts with persons that export sensitive 
technology to Iran (CISADA, 2010, p.80) 
 7) Sec. 107—Harmonization of criminal penalties for violations of sanctions 
  −Violations occurring within the United States (CISADA, 2010, p.81) 
 8)Sec. 108—Authority to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions 
imposing sanctions with respect to Iran (CISADA, 2010, p.84) 
 9) Sec. 109—Increased capacity for efforts to combat unlawful or terrorist financing 
(CISADA, 2010, p.84) 
  −Sec. 113 details the sense of Congress regarding Iran and Hezbollah (CISADA, 
2010, p.90) 
 10) Sec. 114—Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of multilateral sanctions with 
respect to Iran (CISADA, 2010, p.91) 
  −Sec. 114(1): in general, effective multilateral sanctions are preferable to 
unilateral sanctions in order to achieve desired results from countries such as Iran 
 
b. Executive Order 13590: Dealings with Iranian Petroleum Industry Updates (U.S. 
Department of State, 2011)  
 1) Update Provision  
  −The sale, lease, or provision of goods, services, technology, or support to Iran 
that could directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop 
petroleum resources located in Iran could trigger sanctions if a single transaction has a fair 
market value of $1 million or more, or if a series of transactions from the same entity have a fair 
market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period  
 
c. Executive Order 13382: Company/Individual Specific Sanctions (U.S. Department of 
State, 2011) 
 1) Nuclear Procurement Sanctions  
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  −Companies specifically targeted by sanctions because of their role in Iran’s 
nuclear procurement networks) 
   ⋅Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company 
   ⋅Noor Afzar Gostar Company 
   ⋅Fulmen Group 
   ⋅Yasa Part 
  −Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Sanctions 
   ⋅Javad Rahiqi 
   ⋅Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) 
   ⋅Neka Novin 
   ⋅Parto Sanat 
   ⋅Paya Partov 
   ⋅Simatic 
   ⋅Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA)  
  −E.O. 13382 blocks the assets under U.S. jurisdiction of the designated persons 
and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions involving the above companies  
 
d. Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
 1) Special Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International Transactions 
of Primary Money Laundering Concern (FinCEN, 2001) 
  −This Section allows for identifying customers using correspondent accounts, 
including obtaining information comparable to information obtained on domestic customers and 
prohibiting or imposing conditions on the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of correspondent or 
payable-through accounts for a foreign banking institution 
 2) Identification of the Entire Iranian Financial Sector 
  −Including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks, and branches, and 
subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran as posing illicit finance risks for the global 
financial system (U.S. Department of State, 2011) 
 3) Parallel to International Action 
  −Action reinforces U.S. and international sanctions already in place against Iran 
and provides greater certainty that the U.S. financial system is protected from Iranian illicit 
activity (U.S. Department of State, 2011)  
 
 
 
